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The	 so-called	 time	 of	 the	 politique	 des	 réunions	 is	 considered	 a	 momentous	




















just	 war,1	but	 rather	 of	 chicanery	 and	 aggression	 executed	 in	 peacetime.	 On	 the	
other	 hand,	 in	 spite	 of	 its	 initial	 success	 the	 politique	 des	 réunions	 ended	 up	 in	
failure.	Louis	XIV’s	power	politics	provoked	a	long,	costly	war	at	the	end	of	which	he	
was	compelled	 to	 renounce	 the	vast	majority	of	his	 territorial	acquisitions.	 It	 is	no	
coincidence	if	researchers	have	dedicated	much	more	time	to	its	condemnation	(or	
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it	 remains	 the	most	 intriguing	and	embarrassing	episode	of	Louis’s	XIV	reign.	 If	 for	
Bluche	the	réunions	were	unproblematic,2	for	Lossky	they	were	the	consequence	of	
some	kind	of	state	of	transitory	mental	confusion;	3	for	some	they	were	a	sort	of	war	
crimes,4	while	 for	others	 it	was	more	a	question	of	manners	 than	of	 legitimacy.5	In	
an	 attempt	 to	 save	 the	 king’s	 reputation	 some	 authors	 have	 opted	 to	 blame	
somebody	else	for	what	was	a	brutal	and	dishonourable	strategy	that	ended	badly.	
This	 is	 the	 origin	 of	 the	 French	 historiographical	 obsession	 with	 attribution	 of	






of	 the	 stratégie	 de	 cabinet	 –that	 is,	 the	 tight	 control	 and	 central	 planning	 of	 all	




                                                
2	François	Bluche,	Louis	XIV,	(Paris:	Fayard,	1986),	p.	412-429.	
3	Andrew	Lossky,	 “The	 Intellectual	Development	of	 Louis	XIV	 from	1661	 to	1715”,	 in	Louis	XIV	
and	Absolutism,	ed.	by	Ragnhild	Hatton	(London:	Macmillan,	1976),	101-29	(p.	114-15	and	117-
18)	




6 Camille Rousset, Histoire de Louvois et de son administration politique et militaire depuis la paix de 
Nimègue, 4 vols. (Paris: Didier et Cie, 1861-1863; 1863), I, p. 1-6. Émile Bourgeois, “Louvois et 
Colbert de Croissy (les Chambres de réunion)”, Revue historique, 34 (1887), 413-18. Gaston Zeller, 
“Louvois, Colbert de Croissy et les Réunions de Metz”, Revue historique, 131 (1919), 267-275.	 Louis	
André,	Louis	XIV	et	L’Europe,	 (Paris:	Albin	Michel,	1950),	p.	188-190.	 Interestingly,	according	 to	
this	 author	 Croissy	 was	 responsible	 for	 the	 plan,	 while	 Pomponne	 and	 Louvois	 were	 the	
executors.	 André Corvisier, Louvois, (Paris: Fayard, 1983), pp. 437-44, also acknowledged the indirect 
participation of Vauban. 
7 Nowadays it is generally accepted the shared responsibility of Louis XIV, Louvois and Croissy, with 
the indirect participation of other senior officials, like Vauban and Chamlay. A recent reappraisal of 
this question in Jean-Philippe Cénat, Le roi stratège: Louis XIV et la direction de la guerre, 1661-1715, 
(Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2010), p. 127-128, see also his appreciation on the 
responsibility for the ravaging of the Palatinate, p. 146-148. About Louis XIV’s personal involvement 
in all decisions concerning war and foreign affairs see: Lossky, “The Intellectual Development of 
Louis XIV”, p. 106, and also: John C. Rule, “Louis XIV, Roi-Bureaucrate”, in Rule (ed.), Louis XIV 





9	Building	 on	 a	 remark	 by	 Rousset,	 Corvisier	 defined	 the	 politique	 des	 réunions	 as	 “défense	
agressive”,	 Corvisier,	 Louvois,	 p.	 435	 y	 ff.	 Although	 Corvisier’s	 interpretation	 is	 generally	






of	 its	 borders	 and	 an	 overhaul	 of	 its	 defences	 (the	 famous	 ceinture	 de	 fer).10	
However,	as	some	authors	have	pointed	out,	we	should	not	take	this	pretension	of	
rationality	too	far.11	The	annexations	were	not	carried	out	consistently,	and	in	some	
cases	they	proved	counterproductive.	 In	any	case,	since	they	were	 implemented	 in	









on	 the	politique	des	 réunions.	 Besides,	 since	most	of	 the	 réunions	 ended	up	being	
ephemeral,	 researchers	have	 focused	mainly	on	 those	 cases	of	 special	 significance	
for	 the	 narrative	 of	 the	 formation	 of	 the	 national	 territory	 of	modern	 France	 (i.e.	
Alsace).13	As	a	result	the	réunions	have	been	studied	mainly	as	regional	phenomena	
in	 which	 borders	 are	 treated	 as	 mere	 landmarks	 in	 the	 process	 of	 nation-state	
building	instead	of	scenarios	of	complex	interactions	at	different	levels.14	After	all,	it	





This	 regional	 focus	 has	 diverted	 attention	 from	 other	 forms	 of	 aggression	
implemented	 all	 along	 the	 French	 borders	 that	 did	 not	 necessarily	 lead	 to	 formal	
territorial	annexations	and	cannot	be	easily	explained	by	the	defensive	rationale.	In	




Louis	XIV.	Essays,	 1680-1720,	by	and	 for	Mark	A.	Thomson,	 ed.	 by	 Ragnhild	 Hatton	 and	 John	 S.	
Bromley	(Liverpool:	Liverpool	University	Press,	1968),	7-23.		
12	Andrew	 Lossky,	 Louis	XIV	and	the	French	Monarchy,	 (New	 Brunswick	 NJ:	 Rutgers	 University	
Press,	1994),	p.	172.	
13	See	 for	 example:	 George	 Livet,	 L’intendance	 d’Alsace	 sous	 Louis	 XIV	 1648-1715,	 (Paris:	
Publications	 de	 la	 Faculté	 des	 Lettres	 de	 l’Université	 de	 Strasbourg,	 1956).	 The	 origin	 of	 this	
traditional	 focus	on	Alsace,	and	particularly	on	Strasbourg,	 is	directly	 related	with	 the	 “Alsace-




limites	septentrionales	de	la	France	de	1659	à	1789,	 (Paris:	A.	&	 J.	 Picard,	1970).	Ultimately,	 this	
approach	 is	 rooted	 in	 the	old	 and	 currently	much	discredited	 idea	of	 the	 “natural	 frontiers”	of	
France,	about	this	see:	Gaston	Zeller,	“La	monarchie	d’Ancien	Régime	et	les	frontières	naturelles”,	
Revue	d’histoire	moderne,	t.	8,	nº	9,	(1933),	305-333,	Peter	Sahlins,	“Natural	Frontiers	Revisited:	





fact,	 the	 politique	 des	 réunions	 embraced	 but	 was	 not	 limited	 to	 the	 réunions	
themselves.	In	this	sense	it	is	better	understood	as	a	form	of	power	politics	than	as	a	
form	of	military	strategy.	The	politique	des	réunions	was	a	way	to	impose	Louis	XIV’s	











territorial	 rights),	without	 the	uncertainties	and	costs	of	a	 full-fledged	war	and	the	
constraints	inherent	to	peace	talks.	
In	 this	paper	 I	will	 try	 to	give	some	 insight	 into	the	disturbing	 implications	that	
this	form	of	power	politics	had	not	only	for	border	affairs	but	also	more	generally	for	
the	rule	of	ius	gentium.	My	paper	however	will	not	focus	on	the	northern	or	eastern	
borders	 where	 the	 chambres	 de	 réunion	 were	 formally	 established.	 Instead,	 my	
attention	 turns	 to	 the	 southwest,	 particularly	 to	 the	 French-Spanish	 border	 in	 the	
Basque-speaking	Bidasoa	River	 region	situated	between	 the	Gulf	of	Biscay	and	 the	
western	 Pyrenees.	Unlike	 Flanders,	 Alsace	or	 the	 Franche-Comté,	 the	Bidasoa	was	
far	from	being	a	strategic	priority	for	Louis	XIV.	In	fact,	military	activity	in	the	region	
was	 consistently	 low	 during	 the	 whole	 period.	 The	 Sun	 King	 never	 attempted	 to	
invade	 Castile	 –the	 heartland	 of	 the	 Spanish	 Monarchy,	 like	 the	 latter	 used	 to	
menace	Paris	 from	the	Low	Countries.	This	 is	more	striking	 if	we	take	 into	account	
that	the	Pyrenean	border	was	frequently	ill	defended.	On	the	contrary,	the	king	even	
gave	permission	to	his	vassals	to	establish	treaties	of	amity	or	bonne	correspondance	
during	wartime.	As	 a	 consequence,	 French	and	Spanish	neighbouring	 communities	
could	 continue	 to	 enjoy	 peaceful	 relations	 and	 trade	 even	 when	 their	 respective	
sovereigns	 were	 at	 war.	 The	 reason	 alleged	 for	 this	 permission	 was	 the	 extreme	
poverty	 of	 those	 provinces,	whose	population	 could	 only	 survive	 by	 the	 import	 of	
foodstuffs.	 For	 the	 same	 reason	maintenance	 of	 a	 large	 army	 on	 these	 territories	
resulted	 too	complicated	 from	a	 logistical	point	of	 view.	For	all	 these	 reasons,	 the	




of	 French	 power	 politics	 just	 like	 other	 strategic	 border	 regions.	 Far	 from	 being	
                                                
15	Georg	Shwarzenberger,	“Jus	Pacis	ac	Belli?	Prolegomena	to	a	Sociology	of	 International	Law”,	
American	Journal	of	International	Law,	v.	37,	nº	3	(1943),	460-479.	
16	Fernando	Chavarría	Múgica,	 “Por	 codicia	 o	 necesidad:	 la	 exención	 aduanera	 vascongada	 y	 el	
sistema	fronterizo	de	conversas	a	finales	del	siglo	XVII”	in	Los	ámbitos	de	la	fiscalidad:	fronteras,	










demonstrate	 that	 even	 if	 every	 aggression	 was	 justified	 by	 opportunistic	 ad	 hoc	
arguments,	French	power	politics	were	informed	by	a	more	general	political	doctrine	
that	intended	to	legitimate	the	sovereign’s	arbitrary	use	of	force.	The	result	was	the	
debasing	 of	 both	 the	 rule	 of	 border	 customary	 law	 and	 ius	 gentium	 in	 general,	
including	traditional	ways	of	settling	disputes	between	border	communities.	
I	 will	 begin	 explaining	 briefly	 the	 legal	 and	 cultural	 background	 of	 border	
relations	 in	 the	 Bidasoa.	 Secondly,	 I	 will	 expose	 the	 devastating	 effects	 of	 French	
power	politics	during	the	1680s.	Finally,	I	will	analyse	French	justifications	and	their	







the	 Spanish	 “city”	 of	 Fonterabie	 over	 the	 river	 Bidasoa	 itself.18	Traditionally,	 its	
jurisdiction	embraced	the	entire	course	of	the	river	from	the	limits	of	the	Kingdom	of	
Navarre	to	its	mouth	in	the	Gulf	of	Biscay.	That	included	not	only	its	own	shore,	but	
also	 the	 opposite	 side	 of	 the	 river	 (that	 is,	 the	 “French”	 shore)	 and	 any	 islet	 in	
between.	 In	 practice,	 this	 meant	 that	 Fonterabie	 could	 impose	 very	 restrictive	
conditions	 on	 navigation,	 trade,	 building,	 and	 access	 to	 natural	 resources	 on	 the	
Bidasoa	 to	 the	 inhabitants	 of	 neighbouring	 villages,	 including	 the	 people	 from	 the	
French	village	of	Hendaye	on	the	other	side	of	the	river.	Its	rights	were	founded	on	
the	“right	of	first	occupant”	because	Fonterabie	claimed	his	foundation	went	back	to	
Roman	times	while	 the	small	village	of	Hendaye	existed	only	since	 the	 late	Middle	
                                                
17	The	Bidasoa	affair	was	a	 recurrent	 theme	on	 the	correspondance	between	Louis	XIV	and	his	
ambassadors	 in	Madrid,	Ana	Álvarez	López,	La	fabricación	de	un	imaginario:	los	embajadores	de	





Guipúzcoa,	 Susana	 Truchuelo,	 La	representación	de	las	corporaciones	 locales	guipuzcoanas	en	el	
entramado	político	provincial	(siglos	XVI-XVII),	 (San	 Sebastián:	Diputación	 de	Guipúzcoa,	 1997).	
Nevertheless	 Fonterabie’s	 jurisdiction	 embraced	 a	 relatively	 extense	 territory	 from	 the	 river	
Bidasoa	to	the	eastern	bank	of	 the	estuary	of	Pasajes,	comprising	villages	 like	 Irún-Iranzu	(just	
few	kilometers	up	to	the	river	Bidasoa),	as	well	as	the	port	of	San	Juan	and	the	small	village	of	
Lezo	(both	in	the	estuary	of	Pasajes).	Fonterabie	maintained	serious	controversies	not	only	with	
the	 French	 village	 of	 Hendaye	 but	 also	 with	 the	 communities	 under	 its	 direct	 jurisdiction,	




Ages.19	These	 claims	 were	 partially	 sanctioned	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 sixteenth	
century	by	a	cross-border	commission	entitled	to	clarify	the	situation	after	a	series	of	
clashes	 between	 the	 two	 border	 communities.20	Fonterabie	 was	 also	 powerful	












In	more	exceptional	occasions,	 the	 threat	came	not	 from	formal	 transgressions	
but	 from	 highly	 symbolic	 performances	 intended	 to	 question	 and,	 when	 possible,	
erode	the	status	quo.22	Defiance	could	easily	lead	to	violent	clashes.	In	fact,	violence	
played	a	very	 important	 role	 in	 the	assertion	or	contestation	of	 rights.	That	 is	why	
these	 kinds	 of	 confrontations	 were	 far	 from	 being	 spontaneous	 or	 uncontrolled.	
They	were	strictly	regulated	by	custom	and	followed	a	precise	script.	Violence	hence	
was	not	only	limited	but	also	highly	ritualised.	In	most	cases	it	was	mainly	symbolic	
rather	 than	 purely	 physical.	 It	 was	 also	 communal.	 No	 matter	 how	 many	 people	






exchange.	But	border	communities	had	 incentives	 to	prevent	 spirals	of	aggression.	
After	all	they	were	neighbours.	They	were	compelled	to	live	side	by	side	and	to	share	
                                                
19	About	this	see	Hugo	Grotius,	De	jure	belli	ac	pacis	libri	tres,	(The	Classics	of	International	Law,	
ed.	by	James	Brown	Scott,	Carnegie	Endowment	of	International	Peace,	2	vols.,	Oxford:	Clarendon	
Press,	 1913),	 v.	 I,	 lib.	 II,	 cap.	 III:	 “De	 acquisitione	originaria	 rerum,	 ubi	 de	mari	 et	 fluminibus”,	
particularly	nº	XVIII.	Fonterabie	claimed	that	the	Oiasso,	Oiasona	or	Oiarso	quoted	by	Ptolomy,	
Strabo,	 and	 Pliny,	 was	 actually	 his	 direct	 Roman	 predecessor.	 However	 the	 neighbouring	




About	 these	 early,	 provisory	 negotiations:	 Théodoric	 Legrand,	 Essai	 sur	 les	 différends	 de	
Fontarabie	avec	le	Labourd	du	XVme	au	XVIIIme	siècle,	(Pau:	J.	Empérauger,	1905),	p.	3-23.	









(even	 if	 unequally)	 spaces	 and	 resources.	 Despite	 the	 frequent	 conflicts,	 this	
contributed	to	maintain	the	status	quo.23	
There	 was	 a	 specific	 way	 to	 deal	 with	 each	 of	 these	 issues,	 but	 the	 general	
principle	was	that	they	were	local	affairs	that	had	to	be	managed	by	local	authorities	
following	local	custom.	Consequently,	it	was	expected	that	all	agents	involved	in	this	
kind	 of	 border	 affair	 had	 to	 be	 locals.	 This	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 border	 communities	
acted	without	at	least	the	implicit	consent	of	royal	officials.	The	King	of	Spain	had	a	
particular	interest	in	favouring	the	status	quo.	Fonterabie	held	a	small	garrison	paid	
for	 by	 the	 royal	 treasury	 and	 a	 fortress	 that	 constituted	 the	 first	 line	 of	 defence	
against	the	enemy	in	case	of	invasion.	Fonterabie’s	dominant	position	in	the	Bidasoa	
hindered	 the	 possibility	 of	 a	 surprise	 attack	 or	 any	 other	 unexpected	 threat	 from	
across	the	border.	This	was	 important	because	the	Basque	border	was	much	more	
close	 to	 the	 Spanish	 heartland	 than	 it	 was	 to	 the	 French	 political	 core.	 Royal	
interference	 in	 border	 affairs	 was	 not	 entirely	 precluded,	 but	 it	 remained	 quite	
exceptional.	Even	in	these	cases	royal	authorities	preferred	to	keep	a	low	profile	to	
prevent	 escalation	 and	 avoid	 any	 undesired	 engagement.	 Ordinarily,	 the	
management,	 enforcement,	 contestation,	 and	 eventual	 negotiation	 of	 rights	 in	
border	spaces	remained	in	the	hands	of	local	authorities.24	
In	certain	occasions	sovereigns	interfered	in	border	affairs	unintentionally.	Since	
the	end	of	 the	 fifteenth	century	 the	Bidasoa	had	become	a	place	of	encounter	 for	
the	Spanish	and	French	monarchs.	During	this	period	the	river	was	the	scenario	of	
various	meetings	and	exchanges	between	kings,	queens,	and	other	members	of	the	
ruling	 families	 of	 Spain	 and	 France.	 In	 such	 occasions	 the	 ordinary	 jurisdictional	
border	between	territories	was	transformed	into	a	ceremonial	border	between	royal	
courts.	 In	 principle,	 the	 selection	 of	 the	 Bidasoa	 as	 the	most	 appropriate	 place	 to	
stage	 these	 extraordinary	 events	 was	 motivated	 by	 practical	 reasons	 that	 had	
nothing	to	do	with	the	local	context.	However,	since	the	presence	of	the	sovereign	
was	an	act	of	sovereignty	in	itself,25	the	way	in	which	court	ceremonies	were	staged	
and	 performed	 was	 extraordinarily	 important	 for	 the	 assertion	 or	 refusal	 of	 any	
jurisdictional	 claim.26	That	 could	 be	 the	 case	 even	 if	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 king's	
presence	 at	 the	 border	was	 completely	 different	 from	 the	 one	 envisaged	 by	 local	
                                                




24	This	was	 a	 common	 feature	 of	 border	 communities,	 see	 Fernando	Chavarría	Múgica,	 “En	 los	
confines	de	la	soberanía.	Facerías,	escalas	de	poder	y	relaciones	de	fuerza	transfronterizas	en	el	
Pirineo	Navarro	(1400-1615)”	 in	Les	sociétés	de	frontière	de	la	Mediterranée	à	l'Atlantique	(XVIe-
XVIIIe	siècle),	 ed.	 by	Michel	Bertrand	 and	Natividad	Planas	 (Madrid:	 Casa	de	Velázquez,	 2011),	




25	Peter	 Sahlins,	 Boundaries:	 The	 Making	 of	 France	 and	 Spain	 in	 the	 Pyrenees,	 (Berkeley:	
University	of	California	Press,	1989),	p.	27-28.	
26	See	María	José	del	Río	Barredo,	“Imágenes	para	una	ceremonia	de	frontera.	El	intercambio	de	







met	 during	 several	 weeks	 on	 an	 islet	 in	 the	middle	 of	 the	 Bidasoa.	 The	 islet	 was	
appropriately	 prepared	 not	 only	 to	make	 the	meetings	 as	 comfortable	 as	 possible	
but	 also	 to	 represent	 an	 exact	 symmetry	 between	 the	 two	 monarchies.	 These	
protocolary	arrangements	were	 intended	to	signify	the	equal	status	of	the	kings	of	
Spain	 and	 France.	 In	 order	 to	 reinforce	 this	 idea	 the	 islet	 itself	 was	 declared	
“neutral”.	 Thus	 nobody	 could	 allege	 a	 position	 of	 superiority	 over	 the	 other	 party	




encounter	 of	 the	 two	 plenipotentiaries	 (or	 the	 sovereigns	 themselves,	 as	 would	
happen	in	1660)	on	an	islet	in	the	middle	of	the	river	seemed	very	convenient.	But	
this	insistence	on	symmetry	between	monarchies	had	a	disturbing	effect	on	border	
communities.	 It	 constituted	 a	 potentially	 dangerous	 precedent	 for	 Fonterabie’s	
claims	 over	 the	 whole	 river.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 for	 Hendaye	 it	 was	 an	 excellent	
opportunity	to	push	for	renegotiation	of	the	conditions	of	use	of	the	river.	Following	
an	established	principle,	 the	plenipotentiaries	negotiating	a	peace	 treaty	on	behalf	
of	 their	 respective	 sovereigns	 did	 not	 get	 involved	 in	 a	 local	 quarrel	 completely	
unrelated	with	 the	war	 that	 they	were	 trying	 to	 finish.	They	 limited	 themselves	 to	
acting	as	mediators	between	the	 two	parties.	The	Bidasoa	affair	was	never	part	of	
the	 official	 agenda.	 However	 it	 seems	 that	 Hendaye	 was	 persuasive	 enough	 to	
engage	Cardinal	Mazarin	in	the	defence	of	its	rights.28	
At	 the	 very	 end	 of	 the	 negotiation	 the	 French	 plenipotentiary	 pushed	 for	 the	
introduction	of	a	secret	clause	expressing	the	willingness	of	both	sides	to	reach	an	
amicable	settlement	of	any	dispute	between	border	communities	on	the	Bidasoa.	By	






customary	 doctrine.	 In	 principle,	 it	 respected	 the	 distinction	 between	 local	 affairs	
and	 the	 superior	 sphere	 of	 sovereignty.	 It	was	 expected	 that	 border	 communities	
would	arrive	at	some	kind	of	agreement	following	customary	arrangements.	The	role	
of	royal	officials	was	limited	to	mediation	and,	in	the	last	instance,	co-arbitration.29	
                                                
27	BNF	[Bibliothèque	Nationale	de	France],	Occid.,	Ms.	Français	7156,	ff.	26-27v	and	34:	Mazarino	
to	Le	Tellier,	 Saint-Jean-de-Luz,	30	 July	1659,	 and	4	August	1659,	 respectively.	 See	 also	Daniel	
Séré,	 La	Paix	des	Pyrénées:	Vingt-quatre	ans	de	négociations	entre	 la	France	et	 l’Espagne	 (1635-
1659),	(Paris:	Honoré	Champion,	2007),	p.	450-455.		
28	A	detailed	discussion	of	this	episode	in	Fernando	Chavarría	Múgica,	“La	frontera	ceremonial	y	
la	 frontera	 real:	 El	 tratado	de	 los	Pirineos	 y	 la	 reavivación	del	 conflicto	por	 el	 dominio	del	 río	
Bidasoa	 (1659-1668)”,	 in	 Del	 tractat	 dels	 Pirineus	 a	 l'Europa	 del	 segle	 XXI:	 un	 model	 en	
construcció?,	ed.	by	Oscar	Janè,	(Barcelona:	Museu	d'Història	de	Catalunya,	2010),	75-86.	
29	The	text	of	the	secret	clause	both	in	Spanish	and	French	in	José	Antonio	Abreu,	Colección	de	los	





Peace	 of	 the	 Pyrenees	 was	 an	 unexpected	 entanglement	 of	 sovereigns	 in	 an	
apparently	 petty	 jurisdictional	 affair.	 Thus	 the	 quarrels	 between	 Fonterabie	 and	
Hendaye	 in	 the	Bidasoa	slid	 into	the	sphere	of	diplomacy	and	high	politics.	 In	 fact,	
after	a	few	unfruitful	attempts	at	mediation,	royal	officials	decided	to	resort	to	their	
respective	masters.	At	 this	 stage	 local	authorities	of	both	border	 communities	 lost	
the	lead	role	in	favour	of	high-ranking	ministers.	The	question	was	reviewed	at	the	
Spanish	court	by	petition	of	the	French	ambassador.	From	the	beginning	it	became	
clear	 that	 the	 positions	 of	 the	 two	 sides	 differed	 sharply.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	
Spanish	were	willing	 to	 hear	Hendaye’s	 accusations	 against	 Fonterabie	 for	 alleged	
abuses	 in	 the	 Bidasoa	 and,	 if	 necessary,	 to	 correct	 any	wrongdoing.	 On	 the	 other	
hand,	 the	 representative	 of	 the	 King	 of	 France	 wanted	 to	 initiate	 an	 open-ended	
discussion	about	jurisdiction	on	the	Bidasoa	itself.	That	was	of	course	a	red	line	for	
the	Spanish.	The	French	began	to	treat	the	affair	not	as	a	conventional	controversy	
between	 townsfolk	 but	 as	 a	matter	 of	 State.	 This	 shift	was	 particularly	 dangerous	
because	 Louis	 XIV	 could	 then	 feel	 justified	 to	 intervene	 directly	 in	 the	 Bidasoa	 in	




During	 the	 following	months	 French	 and	 Spanish	 representatives	met	 at	 the	 same	
islet	 in	 the	middle	 of	 the	 Bidasoa	 as	 the	 royal	 plenipotentiaries	 during	 the	 peace	
negotiations,	but	in	a	much	less	glamorous	fashion.	However,	the	position	of	the	two	
commissions	 was	 so	 distant	 that	 not	 only	 was	 agreement	 impossible,	 but	 further	




the	 hands	 of	 the	 locals,	 as	 was	 first	 proposed	 by	 the	 Spanish.	 The	 building	 of	 a	
fortified	tower	in	Hendaye	to	survey	the	tract	of	the	river	closest	to	the	village	was	
another	clear	signal	that	the	negotiations	were	condemned	to	failure	from	the	very	
beginning.	 Instead	 of	 a	 common	 arbitration	 each	 party	 ended	 up	 proclaiming	
separately	the	legitimacy	of	their	respective	claims.	Sometime	afterwards	a	new	war	
broke	out	between	the	French	and	Spanish	monarchies.	
In	 the	 following	 years	 the	 status	 quo	 remained	 the	 same	 and	 Fonterabie	
continued	to	enjoy	a	dominant	position	on	the	border.	Nonetheless,	developments	
around	 the	 secret	 clause	 had	 other	 serious	 even	 if	 subtle	 consequences.	 By	
declaration	 of	 the	 French	 commissioner,	 confirmed	 by	 Louis	 XIV	 in	 January	 1668	
(that	 is,	when	 the	War	of	Devolution	was	already	declared),	 the	king	 reserved	 the	
right	to	retaliate	against	Fonterabie	if	it	obstructed	Hendaye’s	alleged	jurisdiction	on	
                                                                                                                                      
reglamento	 de	 límites,	 comercio,	 navegación,	 etc.,	 hechos	 por	 los	 pueblos,	 reyes	 y	 príncipes	 de	





fundamental	 value	of	 customary	order	on	 the	border:	 trust	between	neighbouring	
communities.	For	this	reason,	this	time	Fonterabie	was	very	reluctant	to	participate	
in	 the	 customary	 treaty	 of	 bonne	 correspondance	 negotiated	 by	 provincial	
representatives	 from	both	 sides	 of	 the	border.	 Even	 if	 Louis	 XIV	never	 questioned	
the	validity	of	these	traditional	agreements,	implementation	of	power	politics	on	the	
Basque	 border	 disrupted	 this	 traditional	 mechanism	 of	 mutual	 obligation	 that	
prevented	 violence	 between	 neighbouring	 communities	 and	made	 possible	 cross-














of	 bonne	 correspondance	 was	 established	 on	 the	 Bidasoa	 border.	 But	 these	
agreements	were	only	valid	as	long	as	the	war	lasted.	Once	the	war	was	over	a	year	
later	border	tensions	re-flourished.	





the	 discrete	 terms	 in	 which	 it	 was	 done,	 gave	 the	 King	 of	 France	 the	 excuse	 to	
transform	a	local	border	affair	into	a	diplomatic	incident.	However,	the	truth	is	that,	
in	general	terms,	until	that	moment	Louis	XIV	had	followed	established	formalities,	







meeting	 between	 the	 two	monarchs	 and	 the	 delivery	 of	 Princess	Marie-Louise	 of	
                                                
30	AHN,	 Estado,	 libro	 655,	 f.	 187-88:	 [Print]	 Sentence	 on	 the	 Bidasoa	 affair	 by	 the	 French	
commissioners	d’Artagnan	and	St.	Martin-Barrez	(issued	in	26	February	1667,	and	confirmed	by	
Louis	XIV	in	25	January	1668)	





presented	 numerous	 opportunities	 to	 challenge	 the	 status	 quo	 in	 the	 border.	We	
cannot	forget	that,	though	the	event	was	planned	to	its	minimal	detail	at	the	royal	
courts,	the	people	in	charge	of	the	preparations	were	locals.	That	is	why	Fonterabie	
was	 particularly	 attentive	 that	 events	 preceding	 the	 ceremony	 not	 be	 used	 as	 an	
excuse	 for	 undermining	 its	 jurisdiction.	 There	 were	 of	 course	 various	 incidents	
between	the	two	border	communities	during	the	preparations,	but	care	was	taken	
to	not	to	disturb	the	development	of	the	official	ceremony.33	
In	 the	 weeks	 following	 the	 royal	 meeting,	 border	 tensions	 mounted	 rapidly.	
Hendaye's	acts	of	defiance	became	not	only	 frequent	but	also	much	more	serious.	
The	Spanish	were	surprised	to	see	how	their	fishmongers	were	beaten,	their	vessels	
shot,	 and	 their	 fish	 traps	 destroyed.	 Hendaye	 even	 dared	 to	 capture	 one	 of	 their	
boats	and	sent	their	occupants	to	the	city	of	Bayonne	as	prisoners,	“mistreated	like	
in	 wartime”.34	These	 acts	 went	 well	 beyond	 customary	 usage	 at	 the	 border.	 The	
sudden	escalation	of	violence	 in	the	Bidasoa	and	renewed	pressures	by	the	French	
ambassador	convinced	Spanish	authorities	that	these	tensions	were	encouraged	on	
purpose	 “by	 superior	 order”.35	According	 to	 the	 Council	 of	 State	 in	Madrid,	 Louis	
XIV's	 aim	 was	 to	 provoke	 a	 violent	 response	 from	 Fonterabie	 in	 order	 to	 have	 a	
pretext	to	resume	hostilities.	This	suspicion	was	not	founded	uniquely	in	the	Bidasoa	
case	 but	 more	 in	 general	 in	 “French	 restlessness	 and	 in	 what	 they	 attempt	
everywhere”	 (“inquietud	 de	 franceses	 y	 de	 los	 tentativos	 que	 hacen	 por	 todas	
partes”).36	In	 fact,	 the	 exacerbation	 of	 local	 tensions	 all	 along	 the	 French	 borders	
was	so	characteristic	of	the	politique	des	réunions.	
                                                
32	The	delivery	of	the	princess	took	place	in	the	Behobia	pass	on	3	November	1679,	AGS,	Estado,	
leg.	K-1636/37,	nº	88.	
33	For	 instance,	one	day	a	French	boat	entered	 into	 the	river	 from	the	sea.	Apparently	 the	boat	
came	from	the	nearby	port	of	Saint-Jean-de-Luz	to	survey	the	works.	 It	happened	that	the	boat	
had	a	keel	–a	forbidden	vessel	for	the	French	in	the	Bidasoa.	Consequently,	Fonterabie	seized	it.	
In	 accordance	 with	 customary	 practice	 the	 boat	 had	 to	 be	 set	 publicly	 on	 fire	 on	 the	 shore	 -
otherwise	the	seizure	could	be	interpreted	as	an	act	of	piracy.	The	aim	was	the	enforcement	of	
jurisdictional	 rights,	 not	 plundering.	 However,	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 any	 disruption	 of	 the	 royal	
ceremony	authorities	delayed	 the	performance	of	 this	punishment	until	 courtiers	of	both	sides	
had	 left	 the	 border.	Once	 the	 ceremony	 finished	Fonterabie	 could	 finally	 show	 that,	 no	matter	





113r,	 117r-118v,	 133r-v,	 134r-138r,	 and	 151r.	 AHN,	 Estado,	 libro	 628,	 f.	 13-14.	 The	 Spanish	
protested	through	ordinary	diplomatic	channels,	AAE,	CP,	Espagne,	nº65,	f.	59r-60v:	Marquis	of	
the	Balbases	to	the	Marquis	of	Villars,	Madrid,	6	April	1680.	









Initially,	 the	main	 concern	 of	 the	 Spanish	ministers	 in	Madrid	was	 to	 avoid	 an	
apparently	 minor	 incident	 being	 used	 as	 a	 casus	 belli. 37 	Consequently	 they	
concentrated	 their	 efforts	 on	 preventing	 any	 violent	 response	 against	 Hendaye's	
provocations.38	They	 asked	 Fonterabie	 to	 enforce	 its	 jurisdiction	 in	 a	 “moderate”	
manner.39	Moreover,	any	involvement	of	the	garrison	and	the	local	authorities	in	the	
conflict	 was	 explicitly	 prohibited.	 Nonetheless,	 the	 increasing	 hostility	 of	 Hendaye	
and	 soldiers'	 willingness	 to	 help	 their	 friends	 and	 relatives	 in	 town	 made	 these	
instructions	difficult	 to	 implement.40	Eventually	 the	 soldiery	 and	 the	 royal	 officials,	
who	 could	 be	 directly	 accountable,	 were	 compelled	 to	 obey	 but,	 as	 the	 Captain	
General	 of	 Guipúzcoa	 warned,	 the	 same	 could	 not	 be	 imposed	 on	 the	 common	
people.41	The	 ministers	 were	 alarmed	 to	 learn	 that	 townsfolk	 deployed	 pieces	 of	
artillery	 on	 the	 dock	 to	 stop	 any	 attempt	 by	 Hendaye	 to	 recover	 seized	 vessels.42	
These	disturbances	were	enough	for	Louis	XIV	to	accuse	Fonterabie	of	very	serious	
crimes,	including	the	destruction	of	houses	and	even	a	church,	committed	allegedly	
to	 prevent	 partition	 of	 the	 river	 decreed	 by	 him.	 The	 King	 of	 France,	 through	 his	
ambassador	 in	Madrid,	 the	Marquis	of	Villars,	and	his	minister	of	 foreign	affairs	 in	
Paris,	 Colbert	 de	 Croissy,	 demanded	 exemplary	 punishment	 for	 the	 damages	
suffered	by	Hendaye.43	The	demand	was	backed	by	military	threats.	Vauban’s	plan	to	
renew	 the	 fortifications	of	 the	city	of	Bayonne,	 the	provincial	 capital,	 included	 the	
construction	 of	 new	 defences	 for	 Hendaye	 with	 the	 explicit	 purpose	 of	
counterbalancing	Fonterabie’s	power	in	the	Bidasoa.44	At	the	same	time,	an	unusual	
amount	of	troops	concentrated	in	the	southwest	of	France.45	In	fact,	the	commander	
of	 this	 contingent	 threatened	 retaliation	 if	 the	 King’s	 demands	 were	 not	 met.46	




38	“Que	 no	 se	 recelava	 tanto	 de	 las	 hostilidades	 de	 franceses,	 como	 del	 ardor	 de	 los	 de	
Fuenterrabía,	que	pretendían	el	auxilio	de	los	militares	y	que	estuviesen	a	su	arbitrio	las	puertas	








40	AHN,	 Estado,	 libro	 628,	 f.	 3-4:	 D.	 Diego	 de	 Portugal	 to	 the	 King	 of	 Spain,	 San	 Sebastián,	 5	
January	1680.	















Rumours	 were	 heard	 that	 Louis	 XIV	 would	 send	 warships	 to	 Fonterabie	 with	 the	
same	purpose.47	
Rumours	became	reality	at	the	beginning	of	May	1680	with	the	arrival	of	three	
war	brigantines	 in	 front	of	 Fonterabie.	 From	 the	beginning	 the	 commander	of	 the	
French	flotilla	made	clear	his	mission:	his	king	ordered	him	to	seize	any	vessel	sailing	
in	 or	 out	 of	 the	 Bidasoa	 until	 receiving	 reparations	 for	 damages	 caused	 by	
Fonterabie.48	They	met	 the	 threats	 some	 days	 later,	 capturing	 a	 boat	 and	 sending	
their	 occupants	 to	 Bayonne	 as	 prisoners.	 A	 maritime	 blockade	 was	 formally	
established.	From	this	point	on,	Fonterabie	could	only	be	supplied	by	land.	This	was	
not	a	minor	issue	for	a	town	that	depended	on	sea	trade	for	affordable	foodstuffs.	





it	 would	 certainly	 have	 put	 an	 abrupt	 end	 to	 the	 peace	 so	 recently	 signed	 –and	
sealed	 with	 a	 royal	 wedding!	 Instead	 they	 decided	 to	 satisfy	 French	 demands	 by	
appointing	a	judge-commissioner	to	investigate	and,	if	necessary,	punish	the	alleged	
crimes	against	 (in	 the	saying	of	 the	French)	 the	defenceless	people	of	Hendaye,	 in	
the	confidence	that	Louis	XIV	would	do	the	same	with	his	subjects.51	
After	 some	 weeks	 of	 investigation	 the	 Spanish	 judge-commissioner	 concluded	
that	all	 the	alleged	accusations	against	Fonterabie	were	 simply	 false.	Of	 course	he	
acknowledged	 that	 there	 had	 been	 some	 quite	 violent	 quarrels	 and	maybe	 some	
abuses,	but	there	were	no	bombed	houses	or	burned	churches	as	the	French	said.	
On	 the	 contrary,	 if	 somebody	 had	 to	 be	 accused	 it	 should	 be	 Hendaye	 for	 its	
numerous	 infringements	 in	 the	 Bidasoa.52	Louis	 XIV	 did	 not	 think	 the	 same.	 He	
actually	 sent	 a	 commissioner	 to	 the	border	 but	 his	mission	was	 not	 to	 investigate	









50	Enrique	 Otero	 Lana,	 Los	 corsarios	 españoles	 durante	 la	 decadencia	 de	 los	 Austrias.	 El	 corso	
español	 del	 Atlántico	 peninsular	 en	 el	 siglo	 XVII	 (1621-1697),	 (Madrid:	 Ministerio	 de	 Defensa,	
1992).	 José	 Ramón	 Guevara,	 "El	 corso	 Hondarribiarra	 (1690-1714)",	 Boletín	 de	 Estudios	 del	
Bidasoa,	 15,	 (1997),	 35-116.	 The	 French	 described	 the	 people	 of	 Fonterabie	 as	 “pirates	 sans	
quartier”,	AAE,	CP,	Espagne,	nº	67,	 f.	69r:	Lespes	de	Hureaux	 to	Croissy,	 from	the	river	pass,	7	
May	1681.		












the	 people	 of	 Hendaye.53	The	 disparity	 of	 their	 respective	 missions	 made	 any	





when	bad	weather	made	sailing	extremely	dangerous	–as	 in	 the	winter	months.	 In	
the	 meantime	 few	 boats	 from	 Fonterabie	 ventured	 to	 fish	 in	 the	 surrounding	
waters.55	Hendaye	 had	 gained	 full	 control	 of	 the	 Bidasoa.	 Things	 got	 even	 worse	
when	one	morning	the	corpses	of	eleven	inhabitants	of	Hendaye	appeared	close	to	
Fonterabie.56	They	 were	 the	 occupants	 of	 a	 boat	 that	 had	 visited	 the	 French	
brigantines	 the	 day	 before.	 Apparently	 it	 seemed	 a	 shipwreck	 –not	 an	 infrequent	
accident	in	the	turbulent	waters	of	the	Gulf	of	Biscay,	but	French	authorities	accused	
the	 people	 of	 Fonterabie	 of	 murder. 57 	As	 was	 expected	 they	 demanded	
extraordinary	 punishments.	 They	 even	 used	 this	 episode	 as	 a	 diplomatic	 tool,	
presenting	 the	 case	 in	 foreign	 courts	 as	 an	 example	 of	 the	 unjust	 treatment	 that	
France	was	 receiving	 from	Spain.58	Unsatisfied	with	 the	explanations	 from	Madrid,	
Louis	XIV	ordered	retaliation.	Immediately	the	flotilla	extended	its	range	of	action	to	
the	 nearby	 port	 of	 Pasajes,	 which	 was	 also	 under	 the	 jurisdiction	 of	 Fonterabie	
though	 not	 in	 the	 mouth	 of	 the	 Bidasoa.	 They	 captured	 more	 fishermen	 and	
sailors.59	






                                                
53	The	 commissioner	 appointed	 by	 the	 French	 to	 deal	 with	 the	 Bidasoa	 affair	 was	 Joseph	 de	
Lespes	de	Hureaux,	lieutenant	général	du	sénéschal	of	Bayonne,	AAE,	CP,	Espagne,	nº	65,	f.	76-77.	
54	AHN,	 Estado,	 libro	 628,	 f.	 233-4:	 Fernando	 Ramírez	 de	 Alcántara	 to	 the	 King	 of	 Spain,	
Fonterabie,	20	 July	1680,	and	 f.	250-2:	 the	same	 to	 the	Marquis	of	Canales,	Fonterabie,	30	 July	
1680.	
55	The	 sardine	 fishery	 was	 very	 important	 for	 the	 local	 economy,	 particularly	 for	 the	 poorest	





56	Initially,	 Francisco	 Ramírez	 de	 Alcántara	 left	 the	 case	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 the	 ordinary	 justice	
system,	but	the	Viceroy	of	Navarre	informed	the	Spanish	court	that	French	authorities	denied	the	
possibility	 of	 an	 accident	 “and	 they	 have	 sent	 false	 reports	 to	 the	Most	 Christian	 King”,	 AHN,	
Estado,	libro	629,	f.	70,	and	72v-73v:	Consulta	of	the	Council	of	State,	Madrid,	17	May	1681.	
57	AAE,	CP,	Espagne,	nº	66,	f.	98v-99r:	Louis	XIV	to	the	Marquis	of	Villars,	Versailles	8	June	1681.	
58	See	 for	 example:	 BNF,	 Ms.	 Occ.,	 Clairambault	 589,	 f.	 317:	 Croissy	 to	 d'Estrades,	 Versailles,	
French	 ambassador	 in	 Savoy,	 6	 June	 1681.	 By	 that	 time,	 the	 Spanish	 government	 had	 already	






people.61	Representatives	 of	 Guipúzcoa,	 the	 province	 in	 which	 Fonterabie	 was	
located,	wanted	 the	 border	 city	 to	 attend	 to	 all	 French	 demands	 to	 avoid	 further	
retaliation.62	The	 King	 of	 Spain	 sent	 a	 second	 judge-commissioner	 endowed	 with	
special	powers	to	 investigate	and	punish	the	alleged	murders	 in	the	Bidasoa.63	This	
was	an	extraordinary	measure	that	was	only	applied	against	public	malefactors,	and	
that	 could	 be	 interpreted	 as	 a	 presumption	 of	 culpability.64	But	 again,	 he	was	 not	
able	to	find	any	evidence	of	the	crimes.	After	that,	the	court	sent	a	member	of	the	
Council	of	Castile	(the	most	prestigious	judicial	institution	of	the	Spanish	monarchy)	
as	 new	 judge-commissioner	 with	 identical	 results.65	The	 Spanish	 ministers	 were	





before	and	after	 this	 incident:	 recognition	of	Hendaye’s	 right	 to	 fish,	navigate,	and	
trade	 freely	 in	 the	 Bidasoa,	 and	 complete	 jurisdiction	 over	 his	 own	 shore.	 His	
argumentation	did	not	change	either.	The	French	King	accused	Fonterabie	of	various	
violent	 crimes	 and	 abuses	 ever	 since	 1679.	 Every	 single	 border	 incident,	 past	 and	
present,	was	interpreted	as	an	arbitrary	aggression	against	the	“defenceless”	people	
of	 Hendaye.	 “The	 affair	 of	 the	 drowned	 men”	 (as	 the	 Spanish	 authorities	 put	 it)	
reinforced	 the	 rhetoric	 of	 victimisation	 at	 the	 core	 of	 the	 French	 strategy	 in	 the	
Bidasoa.	It	was	also	used	to	justify	strengthening	the	retaliatory	measures	already	in	
place,	namely	the	maritime	blockade	and	the	capture	of	prisoners.	
The	 criminalisation	 of	 Fonterabie	 was	 instrumental	 for	 the	 legitimation	 of	 the	
French	 claims	 on	 the	Bidasoa.	 Since	 armed	 intervention	 in	 a	 common	 controversy	




the	country	 from	which	he	 failed	 to	obtain	 justice,	as	 compensation	 for	his	 losses.	
French	 authorities	 presented	 themselves	 as	 enforcers	 of	 Hendaye’s	 compensation	
                                                
61	AAE,	CP,	Espagne,	nº	67,	f.	161:	Lespes	de	Hureaux	To	Croissy,	Bayonne	25	June	1681.	
62	AHN,	Estado,	libro	628,	ff.	91-92:	D.	Diego	de	Portugal	to	the	King	of	Spain,	1	May	1680.	
63	The	 new	 judge-commissioner	was	 José	 Rodríguez	 Portocarrero	 y	 Silva,	Marquis	 of	 Castrillo,	
alcalde	de	casa	y	corte	 (that	 is,	member	of	 the	Royal	High	Court	 of	Madrid),	AHN,	Estado,	 libro	
629,	f.	294-98:	Consulta	of	the	Council	of	State,	Madrid,	24	August	1681.	Meanwhile,	the	French	
King	 sent	 the	 intendant	 Faucon	 de	 Ris	 to	 Hendaye	 in	 order	 to	 find	 the	 culprits	 of	 the	 alleged	
murders,	AAE,	CP,	Espagne,	nº	66,	f.	137	y	ss.	
64	Juan	 de	 Hevia	 Bolaños,	 Curia	 filipica,	 primera	 y	 segunda	 parte,	 (Madrid:	 Imprenta	 Real	 por	
Mateo	Llanos,	Madrid,	1684;	first	published	in	Lima,	1603),	parte	tercera,	p.	134.	
65	The	 third	 judge-commissioner	was	a	very	respected	 jurist,	D.	 Juan	del	Corral,	member	of	 the	
Council	of	Castile,	AAE,	CP,	Espagne,	nº	66,	f.	142	and	following:	Marquis	of	Villars	to	Louis	XIV,	
Madrid,	11	July	1681;	the	French	ambassador	described	him	as	“ministre	fort	integre”	(f.148r-v)	
66	See	 for	example,	AHN,	Estado,	 libro	629,	 f.	375-9:	Consulta	of	 the	Council	of	State,	Madrid	10	
November	1681.	
67	AAE,	 CP,	 Espagne,	 nº65,	 f.	 20r-v:	 Louis	XIV	 to	 the	Marquis	 of	Villars,	 St.	 Germain,	 30	 Janvier	
1680	[draft	 letter].	A	general	overview	on	this	aspect	 from	the	point	of	view	of	the	theorists	of	




claims.	 As	 they	 said,	 they	 were	 compelled	 to	 intervene	 directly	 because	 French	
villagers	 were	 not	 powerful	 enough	 to	 defend	 themselves	 against	 the	 abuses	 of	
Fonterabie.	This	argumentation	was	seriously	 flawed	for	several	 reasons.	Resort	 to	
the	right	of	reprisal	was	only	legitimate	when	it	was	not	possible	to	obtain	justice	by	
other	means,	and	that	was	not	the	case.	After	all,	the	kings	of	France	and	Spain	were	
at	 peace.	 They	 even	 sealed	 their	 alliance	 with	 a	 royal	marriage.	 According	 to	 the	
terms	 of	 the	 Peace	 of	 Nijmegen,	 any	 dispute	 among	 the	 vassals	 of	 the	 two	
monarchies	 had	 to	 be	 settled	 by	 amicable	 means,	 as	 was	 explicitly	 stated	 in	 the	
secret	 article	 on	 the	 Bidasoa	 of	 the	 Treaty	 of	 the	 Pyrenees	 (1659)	 and	 confirmed	
again	 in	 the	 latest	 negotiations.68	Besides,	 Louis	 XIV	 had	 no	 reason	 to	 doubt	 the	
goodwill	of	the	Spanish	king	–at	least	from	a	formal	point	of	view.	In	fact,	the	king	of	
Spain	 sent	not	one	nor	 two	but	 three	 judge-commissioners	 entitled	 to	punish	and	
repair	 any	 wrongdoing.	 Furthermore,	 French	 claims	 remained	 extremely	 vague.	
Reprisals	were	only	 legitimate	 if	 the	value	of	 the	 seized	goods	did	not	 surpass	 the	
claimant's	economic	 losses,	and	no	attempt	was	made	to	quantify	the	value	of	the	
damages.	 Finally,	 certain	 aggressive	measures	 like	 the	maritime	blockade,	 treating	





the	 Bidasoa,	 Louis	 XIV	 resorted	 to	 other	 legal	 arguments,	 namely	 the	 right	 of	
retaliation.	 Unlike	 reprisal,	 there	 was	 no	 ambiguity	 in	 retaliation:	 it	 was	 an	
unequivocal	act	of	aggression	and	as	such	 it	was	subject	 to	the	 laws	of	war.	While	
reprisals	were	mainly	compensatory,	retaliation	was	about	punishment	of	a	serious	
wrongdoing.	 The	 final	 aim	however	was	 to	deter	 the	opposite	party	 from	harmful	
action	considered	unacceptable.	In	order	to	be	effective	the	target	of	the	retaliatory	
act	had	 to	be	 clearly	 stated	and	 the	aggression	had	 to	be	proportional	 to	 the	one	
previously	enacted	by	the	enemy.	 In	this	sense	retaliation	was	a	 limited	act	of	war	
with	 a	 limited	 purpose:	 re-establishment	 of	 a	 certain	 status	 quo	 ante.	 Retaliatory	





Spanish	 negotiatiors	 at	 Nijmegen	 were	 specifically	 instructed	 to	 not	 permit	 any	 change	 with	
respect	 to	 the	 status	quo	 in	 the	Bidasoa,	AGS,	Estado,	 leg.	K-1670,	nº152:	minuta	 “Relación	del	
principio	 que	 tuvieron	 las	 diferencias	 […]	 sobre	 el	 uso	 del	 río	 Vidasoa	 […]	 hasta	 el	 tiempo	
presente	con	lo	que	Su	Majestad	ha	resuelto	se	obre	en	ella	por	los	plenipotenciarios	de	la	paz	en	
consulta	de	11	de	enero	de	este	año	de	1676”.	
69	Interestingly,	 according	 to	 the	French	minister	 of	maritime	affairs,	 the	mission	of	 the	 flotilla		
was	 precisely	 “faire	 la	 guerre	 aux	 habitants	 de	 Fontarabie”,	 ANF,	 Marine,	 B	 2	 43,	 f.	 200r-v:	
Seignelay	to	Mauclerc,	St.	Germain,	14	April	1680.	This	approach	caused	some	initial	confusion	to	
the	 commander	 in	 charge	 of	 the	 maritime	 blockade,	 who	 was	 seriously	 reprimanded	 for	
accepting	the	validity	of	licences	and	passports	issued	by	the	Spanish	royal	authority:	“Le	Roy	a	
esté	 fort	surpris	d'apprendre	que	vous	ayez	 laissé	passer	 les	chaloupes	et	barques	chargées	de	







Needless	 to	 say,	 French	 authorities'	 resort	 to	 this	 kind	 of	 justification	 was	
problematic.	On	the	one	hand,	Louis	XIV	was	not	interested	in	the	re-establishment	
of	the	old	order	 in	the	Bidasoa,	but	 in	the	 imposition	of	an	entirely	new	one	more	
beneficial	for	the	French.	From	a	legal	point	of	view,	the	right	of	retaliation	could	not	
be	used	to	justify	such	pretensions.	On	the	other	hand,	retaliation	was	by	definition	
a	 response	 to	 a	 previous	 aggression	 –it	 presupposes	 a	 state	 of	 war	 or	 at	 least	 of	






enforcement	 of	 fishing	 and	 navigation	 rights.	 Since	 ordinary	 quarrels	 between	
border	 communities	 could	 hardly	 justify	 such	 a	 disproportionate	 response,	 it	 was	
necessary	 to	present	Fonterabie’s	actions	as	arbitrarily	violent	and	 in	 fact	criminal.	
As	tensions	mounted	there	were	some	specific	circumstances	that	helped	the	French	
to	justify	their	harsh	treatment	of	the	Spanish	border	city.	The	most	serious	of	them	
was	 the	 deployment	 of	 artillery.	 The	 use	 of	 “cannons”	 against	 the	 people	 of	
Hendaye,	 as	 the	 French	 put	 it,	 was	 considered	 an	 illegitimate	 aggression	 that	
required	a	military	response	–that	 is,	 retaliation.71	Needless	to	say	the	affair	of	the	
“drowned	 men”	 was	 used	 as	 a	 confirmation	 of	 the	 criminal	 condition	 of	
Fonterabie,72	but	 it	 is	 worth	 bearing	 in	 mind	 that	 the	 maritime	 blockade	 and	 the	
capture	of	prisoners,	not	to	mention	aggressions	in	other	frontier	territories,	began	
well	 before	 this	 incident.73	The	 retaliatory	 argument	 was	 credible	 only	 insofar	 as	
Fonterabie	 was	 presented	 as	 a	 cruel	 and	 powerful	 aggressor.	 Otherwise	 French	
hostility	would	be	nothing	more	than	an	arbitrary	breach	of	peace.	
The	 resort	 to	 reprisal	 and	 retaliation	was	 hardly	 justified	 but	 they	 were	more	
than	 opportunistic	 pretexts	 for	 brute	 force.	 The	 criminalisation	 of	 Fonterabie	was	
instrumental	not	only	in	providing	the	excuse	for	armed	intervention	but	also	for	the	
advancement	of	French	claims	in	the	Bidasoa.	French	legal	argumentation	was	based	
on	 the	 idea	 that	Fonterabie’s	 jurisdiction	was	unlawful	because	 it	was	 founded	on	
naked	force	only.	Thanks	to	 its	military	superiority	Fonterabie	would	have	imposed	








ambassador	 in:	 AHN,	 Estado,	 libro	 629,	 f.	 99-100.	His	 successor	 at	 the	 embassy,	 La	Vauguyon,	









its	 terms	 and	 conditions	 on	 the	 Bidasoa,	 while	 Hendaye	 and	 other	 border	
communities	were	too	weak	and	too	scared	to	contest	their	claims	effectively.	This	
reasoning	 was	 not	 entirely	 new	 but	 it	 had	 never	 been	 used	 before	 as	 a	 legal	
argument.	 A	 French	 memorandum	 written	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 seventeenth	
century	considered	Fonterabie’s	possesion	of	the	Bidasoa	illegitimate	because	it	was	
supported	 only	 “by	 mere	 force	 and	 the	 law	 of	 arms”	 since	 the	 “Spanish”	 had	
“usurped”	 the	whole	 province	 of	Guipúzcoa	 from	 the	 king	 of	Navarre	 in	 1200.74	It	
also	 refers	 to	 the	 threat	 of	 the	 Fonterabie	 and	 Behobia	 fortresses	 (the	 latter	
demolished	a	century	earlier)	from	which	the	Spanish	fired	their	cannons	against	any	
French	who	approached	 in	vessels	with	a	keel.	The	author	was	particularly	 ironical	
about	 this	 point.	 According	 to	 him,	 the	 Spanish	 based	 their	 rights	more	 on	 canon	
than	 on	 civil	 law,	 due	 to	 the	 continuing	 gunshots	 (“continuelle	 canonades”)	 fired	
against	 the	 French	 –making	 puns	 with	 the	 French	 homonym	 words	 “cannon”	
(artillery)	 and	 “canon”	 (Church	 law).75	The	memorandum	 seemed	 to	 be	written	 to	
encourage	Henry	 IV	 of	 France	 to	 take	 action	 in	 the	 Bidasoa	 at	 a	moment	when	 a	
declaration	 of	 war	 against	 Spain	 seemed	 imminent. 76 	A	 partial	 copy	 of	 this	
memorandum	was	 among	 the	 papers	 of	 the	 historian	 François	 Eudes	 de	Mézeray	
(d.1683).77	The	same	argument	was	timidly	re-proposed	by	the	French	ambassador	
during	the	failed	negotiations	that	followed	the	Peace	of	the	Pyrenees.78	Some	years	
later	Louis	XIV	would	base	his	 strategy	 in	 the	Bidasoa	on	the	same	principle.	From	
this	 point	 of	 view,	 retaliation	 against	 Fonterabie	 was	 justified	 not	 only	 by	 recent	
events	but	also	by	centuries	of	violent	occupation.	
From	a	strictly	juridical	point	of	view	the	French	authorities'	reasoning	remained	
weak.	 In	 principle,	 rights	 of	 reprisal	 and	 retaliation	 were	 limited	 to	 obtaining	
compensation	 for	 incurred	 losses	 and	 the	 restoration	 of	 a	 status	 quo	 ante.	 Louis	
XIV's	aims	did	not	fit	well	into	this	definition.	Apparently	his	purpose	was	simply	to	
justify	 his	 right	 to	 the	 use	 of	 force	 to	 impose	 a	 new	 order	 instead	 of	 defending	
legitimate	claims	 in	a	 lawful	manner.	 In	 fact,	 the	French	explicitly	avoided	entering	
into	 any	 legal	 controversy.	 This	 approach	 caused	 some	 confusion	 to	 Lespes	 de	




review	 the	proceedings	 and	other	 legal	 instruments	 from	past	 negotiations.80	That	
was,	 of	 course,	 ordinary	 practice.	 Instead	 Lespes	 de	 Heureaux	 was	 specifically	
                                                
74	About	 this	 historical	 episode:	 Angel	 Canellas	 López,	 "De	 la	 incorporación	 de	 Guipúzcoa	 a	 la	
Corona	de	Castilla",	En	la	España	Medieval.	Estudios	en	memoria	del	Profesor	D.	Salvador	de	Moxó,	
(Madrid:	Universidad	Complutense,	1982),	II,	p.	11-20.	
75	BNF,	 Ms.	 Occ.,	 Ms.	 François	 15846,	 f.	 97-116:	 "Memoire	 touchant	 la	 Riviere	 de	 Bidasso	 qui	
separe	la	France	dance	l’Espagne".	














of	 them	would	not	 stand	up	 to	 scrutiny.	 That	was	exactly	what	happened	 in	1661	
when	 Francisco	 Ramírez	 de	 Prado,	 a	 respected	 jurist	 of	 the	 Council	 of	 Castile,	
demolished	the	allegations	presented	by	the	former	French	ambassador	in	Madrid.82	
The	only	legal	instrument	alleged	by	Louis	XIV	to	legitimate	his	actions	in	the	Bidasoa	
during	 the	 1680s	 was	 the	 sentence	 dictated	 by	 his	 commissioners	 in	 1667	 and	
confirmed	 by	 himself	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 following	 year	 once	 the	 War	 of	
Devolution	 had	 already	 broken	 out.	 The	 sentence,	 however,	 was	 not	 a	 valid	 legal	
justification	 because	 the	 jurisdiction	 of	 French	 judges	 did	 not	 extend	 to	 foreign	




it	meant	 that	 the	 border	 conflict	 remained	 unsettled.	 The	 only	 case	 in	 which	 the	





Bidasoa	 negotiations	 of	 the	 1660s	 was	 characterised	 by	 a	 lack	 of	 communication	
between	 the	 respective	commissioners,	but	 that	did	not	prevent	 the	Spanish	 from	
actually	dictating	 their	own	sentence.	Obviously,	 the	French	ministers	knew	that.84	
That	is	why	they	prohibited	Lespes	de	Heureaux	from	reviewing	the	proceedings	of	
the	 former	commissioners.85	Otherwise	 the	only	 legal	 instrument	presented	by	 the	
French	in	support	of	their	claims	would	be	immediately	invalidated.86	
The	 same	 could	 be	 said	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 alleged	 violent	 possession	 of	 the	
Bidasoa	–what	the	French	ironically	called	“cannon	law”.	It	is	true	that	enforcement	
of	 Fonterabie’s	 rights	 required	a	 certain	degree	of	 violence.	Along	 the	 years	 there	
were	 numerous	 acts	 of	 defiance	 by	 the	 people	 of	 Hendaye.	 Sometimes	 tensions	
could	 lead	to	violent	clashes.	However,	as	we	have	seen,	all	 these	 limited	conflicts	
were	managed	according	to	customary	law.	The	truth	is	that	Fonterabie’s	jurisdiction	
                                                
81	“Sa	Majesté	ne	voulan	pas	que	vous	entrez	dans	la	discution	des	droits	de	possession	de	ceux	















was	 not	 seriously	 questioned	 for	 a	 very	 long	 time.	 Obviously	 the	 relative	 Spanish	
military	superiority	at	the	border	(thanks	to	its	fortress	and	artillery)	played	a	part	in	
that.	But	their	power	was	backed	by	strong	legal	legitimation:	they	had	the	written	
consent	of	 the	French.	The	 rights	of	 Fonterabie	 in	 the	Bidasoa	were	 founded	on	a	
series	 of	 bilateral	 settlements	 between	 the	 French	 and	 the	 Spanish	 established	 at	
the	beginning	of	the	sixteenth	century.	In	other	words,	for	more	than	a	century	and	
a	 half	 the	 French	 had	 voluntarily	 accepted	 Fonterabie’s	 jurisdiction.87	That	 is	 why	




the	 latter	 may	 have	 led	 to	 a	 right	 to	 compensation,	 but	 in	 neither	 case	 could	
Fonterabie’s	 right	 to	 enforce	 its	 jurisdiction	 be	 questioned.	 Only	 a	 systematically	
disproportionate	 and	 arbitrary	 use	 of	 force	 could	 delegitimize	 its	 status	 in	 the	





retaliation,	 and	 absolute	 sovereign	 power	 seemed	 to	 be	 a	 prelude	 to	 an	 official	
resumption	of	hostilities.	Certainly	it	was	not	only	the	Bidasoa	that	was	at	stake.	As	
we	 have	 already	 said	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 this	work,	 French	 strategic	 priorities	 lay	
elsewhere.	Actually,	 the	vast	majority	of	 Louis	XIV’s	acts	of	aggressions	during	 this	
period,	 including	systematic	pillage,	violent	occupations	and	unilateral	annexations,	
were	committed	 in	the	Spanish	Low	Countries	and	the	Rhineland.88	The	arguments	
used	 to	 justify	all	 these	aggressions	were	not	very	different	 from	the	ones	used	 in	
the	Bidasoa.89	Reprisal,	retaliation,	and	absolute	sovereign	power	were	the	common	
language	of	the	politique	des	réunions.	The	sentences	from	the	chambres	de	réunion	
                                                
87	A	 fact	 acknowledged	 even	 by	 the	 French	 commissioner	 himself:	 “cette	 pernicieuse	 sentence	
provisionelle	de	l'an	1510	laquelle	adiugea	aux	espagnols	l'usage	de	la	riviere	et	navigation	avec	




just	1680	and	1681	the	 infamous	chambre	de	réunion	of	Metz,	 the	most	active	of	 these	special	
courts,	 issued	 around	 fifty	 orders	 of	 annexation	 of	 different	 territories	 mostly	 in	 the	 Empire,	
including	the	county	of	Deux-Ponts	(Zweibrücken)	belonging	to	the	King	of	Sweden	himself,	but	
sometimes	also	in	the	Spanish	Low	Countries,	like	in	the	case	of	the	county	of	Chiny	in	the	duchy	
of	 Luxembourg.	 But	 some	 of	 the	 most	 remarkable	 annexations,	 like	 the	 réunions	 of	 the	
“Décapole”	 of	 Alsace	 and	 the	 annexation	 of	 the	 imperial	 city	 of	 Strasbourg	 (September	 1681),	
took	 place	 by	 order	 of	 the	 Sovereign	 Council	 of	 Besançon.	 In	 other	 cases	 annexations	 were	





raison	 sur	 cette	 derniere	 affaire	 je	 n’atendre	 aussy	 que	 le	 retour	 du	 Courier	 que	 je	 vous	 ay	





had	 the	 same	 function	as	 the	declaration	of	 the	French	commissioners	 in	1667.	 In	
both	 cases	 these	 formalities	 were	 used	 as	 pretexts	 to	 trigger	 direct,	 armed	






enforce	 his	 authority	 and	 defend	 his	 rights	 against	 any	 “rebellious”	 or	 “foreign”	
intervention	in	a	territory	that	was	now	formally	considered	part	of	the	Kingdom	of	




The	 violence	 of	 the	 politique	 des	 réunions	 was	 not	 only	 juridical	 it	 was	 very	
physical	 too.	 The	 réunions	 were	 always	 conducted	 under	 threat	 of	 expropriation,	
imprisonment,	 and	 pillage.	 In	 all	 cases	 threats	 were	 backed	 by	 military	 force.	
Sometimes	bullying	was	enough	to	force	feudal	lords	and	town	authorities	to	change	
allegiance.	 But	 frequently,	 as	 in	 the	 territories	 under	 sovereignty	 of	 the	 King	 of	
Spain,	 feudatories	 and	 provincial	 governors	 refused	 to	 bend	 to	 French	 demands.	
However,	 in	 the	 face	 of	 superior	military	 forces	 and	 the	 explicit	 threat	 of	 general	
reprisals	 they	 had	 no	 other	 option	 than	 to	 give	 up.	 Needless	 to	 say,	 formal	
protestations	and	judicial	allegations	were	completely	useless.	On	the	contrary,	any	
kind	 of	 resistance	 to	 French	 demands	 (which,	 as	 we	 have	 said,	 were	 formally	
presented	as	sentences	or	enforcement	of	treaty	clauses)	were	utilised	to	legitimate	
further	 reprisals.	 When	 the	 General	 Governor	 of	 the	 Low	 Countries	 refused	 an	
“amicable”	proposal	to	exchange	the	recently	annexed	county	of	Chiny	for	another	





and	spread	of	hostility	along	 the	French	 frontiers	 seemed	 to	 indicate	an	 imminent	
war.92	In	fact,	as	soon	as	the	spring	of	1680	Spain	signed	an	alliance	with	the	king	of	
England.	At	 the	end	of	 the	 same	year	 the	Estates	General	of	 the	United	Provinces	
began	to	reconsider	their	position	of	neutrality.	The	king	of	Sweden,	offended	by	the	
                                                
90	Jeanmougin,	Louis	XIV	à	la	conquête,	p.	77-88.	
91	AAE,	CP,	Espagne,	nº	66,	f.	293r:	Louis	XIV	to	Marquis	of	Villars,	St.	Germain,	7	December	1681,	
and	 again,	 f.	 302r-v:	 Louis	 XIV	 to	 Marquis	 of	 Villars,	 St.	 Germain,	 4	 January	 1682:	 “comme	 la	
guerre	qu’ils	croyent	inevitable	en	Flandres	n’est	fondée	que	sur	l’apprehension	qu’ils	en	peuvent	
avoir,	 je	 sçauray	 bien	 aussy	 sans	 la	 recommencer	 punir	 les	 lieux	 coupables	 des	 violences	 et	
hostilités	commises	et	les	faire	repentir	de	n’avoir	pas	donné	la	juste	satisfaction	que	vous	avez	
demandé	de	ma	part”.	






réunion	 of	 Deux-Ponts,	 abandoned	 his	 traditional	 alliance	with	 the	 French	 to	 sign	
another	with	the	Dutch	(October,	1681).	In	February	and	May	of	1682	the	Emperor	
and	 the	 King	 of	 Spain	 joined	 them.	However,	 in	 spite	 of	 all	 this	 frantic	 diplomatic	
activity	the	alliance	fell	apart	quickly,	victim	of	domestic	unrest,	disparate	interests,	
and	the	 fear	of	French	retaliation	 (as	 in	 the	case	of	 the	United	Provinces,	England,	
and	 the	 German	 principalities),	 or	 major	 external	 threats	 (as	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	




an	 end	 to	 the	 land	 blockade	 of	 Luxembourg	 and	 the	 maritime	 blockade	 of	
Fuenterrabía	 and	 announced	 the	 submission	 of	 all	 his	 claims	 to	 the	 arbitration	 of	
King	Charles	II	of	England.94	The	Spanish	pretended	to	accept	the	proposal	but	they	
actually	considered	 it	another	ruse.	After	 few	months	temporising,	Croissy	gave	an	
ultimatum	 to	meet	 his	master’s	 demands.	 In	 the	 summer	 of	 1683	 a	 French	 army	
again	entered	Flanders.	This	time	they	demanded	an	exorbitant	100,000	florins	from	
the	 local	 communities	 to	 avoid	 being	 ransacked.	 When	 the	 Spanish	 military	
authorities	 began	 to	 authorise	 raids	 in	 reprisal,	 the	 French	 responded	 with	 new	
retaliatory	measures.	Louis	XIV	ordered	attacks	on	Spanish	strongholds	to	punish	the	
stubborn	opposition	of	the	Spanish	to	his	offerings.	Finally,	the	Governor	General	of	




allies,	 the	 Spanish	 alone	 could	 not	 cope	 with	 French	 military	 superiority.	 For	 the	
French	 however,	 the	 War	 of	 the	 Reunions	 was	 the	 shortest	 and	 most	 successful	
military	 campaign	 of	 Louis	 XIV’s	 reign.	 The	 French	 concentrated	 their	 efforts	 on	
Luxembourg,	which	was	first	bombed	and	then	besieged.	After	some	resistance	the	
Prince	 of	 Chimay,	 governor	 of	 this	 important	 stronghold,	 was	 compelled	 to	
surrender.	 Interestingly	 enough,	war	 also	 extended	 to	 the	 distant	 Bidasoa	 border.	
This	 time,	 there	 was	 no	 agreement	 of	 bonne	 correspondance.	 As	 soon	 as	 the	
declaration	 of	 war	 was	 confirmed	 the	 military	 governor	 of	 Fonterabie	 fired	 his	
artillery	 against	 the	 new	 fortifications	 that	 the	 French	 were	 building	 in	 Hendaye.	
Much	 to	 his	 surprise,	 the	 French	 responded	 with	 a	 massive	 shelling	 with	 mortar	
bombs	that	destroyed	a	 large	part	of	the	Spanish	city.96	It	 is	worth	bearing	 in	mind	
that	 there	was	a	difference	 in	 intention	between	the	 two	kinds	of	bombardments.	














While	 ordinary	 artillery	 was	 designed	 to	 fire	 horizontally	 against	 walls	 or	 specific	
targets,	mortars	(which	developed	dramatically	during	this	period)	were	specifically	
conceived	 to	 fire	 explosive	 or	 incendiary	 bombs	 in	 a	 parabolic	 manner.97	Since	
mortar	bombs	were	fired	from	much	longer	distances	and	they	were	not	as	accurate	
as	 ordinary	 artillery,	 from	 a	 strictly	 military	 point	 of	 view	 they	 were	 not	 very	
effective	 against	 walls	 and	 fortifications	 –at	 that	 time	 their	 main	 purpose	 was	 to	
cause	 the	greatest	damage	and	spread	havoc	among	 the	population.98	As	 it	 is	well	
known,	during	this	period	the	French	made	extensive	use	of	this	kind	of	weapon.	In	a	
matter	of	months	the	Spanish	were	forced	to	sign	a	dishonourable	truce.		
The	 Truce	 of	 Ratisbon	 was	 signed	 in	 15	 August	 1684.	 French	 demands	 were	
accepted	 unconditionally.99 	The	 terms	 were	 harsh.	 As	 expected,	 the	 strategic	





his	 claims	 became	 legitimised.	 In	 practical	 terms	 the	 politique	 des	 réunions	 was	
equated	to	ius	victorium	–the	right	of	conquest	that	awaited	the	victor	of	a	just	war.	
According	to	the	agreement,	from	then	onwards	the	réunions	would	be	considered	
legal	 and	 honourable	 territorial	 acquisitions	 just	 as	 if	 they	 were	 taken	 from	 the	






anchored	 in	 front	 of	 its	 harbour.100	After	 some	 days	 of	 tense	 expectation	 a	 new	
violent	 incident	 triggered	 a	 new	wave	 of	 reprisals.101	The	 French	 ships	 took	more	
                                                
97	About	 the	 technological	 development	 of	 mortar	 bombs	 in	 this	 period:	 Michel	 Blay,	 "Le	
developpement	de	la	balistique	et	la	pratique	du	jet	de	bombes	en	France	a	la	mort	de	Colbert"	in	
De	la	mort	de	Colbert	a	la	revocation	de	l'edit	de	Nantes:	un	monde	nouveau?,	ed.	by	Louise	Godard	
de	 Donville	 (Marseille:	 Centre	Méridional	 de	 Rencontres	 sur	 le	 XVIIe	 siècle,	 1985),	 33-51,	 and	
Jean	Peter,	L’artillerie	et	les	fonderies	de	la	marine	sous	Louis	XIV,	(Paris:	Economica,	1995).	
98	Chevalier	 de	 Saint-Julien,	La	forge	de	vulcain	ou	l'apareil	des	machines	de	guerre,	 (The	Hague:	
Guillaume	de	Voys,	1710),	68-69	and	77-78.	 See	also:	Guillaume	 le	Blond,	L’Artillerie	raisonnée	
contenant	la	Description	et	l’Usage	des	différentes	bouches	à	feu,	avec	les	principaux	moyens	qu’on	a	
employés	 pour	 les	 perfectionner,	 la	 Théorie	 et	 la	 Pratique	 des	 Mines,	 et	 du	 Jet	 des	 Bombes,	 et	
l’Essentiel	de	tout	ce	que	 l’Artillerie	a	de	plus	 intéressant	depuis	 l’invention	de	 la	Poudre	à	canon,	
(Paris:	Charles-Antoine	Jombert,	1761),	p.	157-8	and	221-3.		
99	Jeanmougin,	Louis	XIV	à	la	conquête,	p.	177-188.		
100	AHN,	 Estado,	 libro	 630,	 f.	 1-8:	 Consulta	 of	 the	 Council	 of	 State,	 Madrid,	 18	 May	 1685.	 The	
flotilla	was	 composed	by	 three	 small	 frigates	 (36	cannons	and	150	crewmen),	 and	 it	would	be	











thinking	 about	 giving	 up	 for	 some	 time.105	In	 the	 Autumn	 of	 1680	 Croissy	 had	
proposed	lifting	the	maritime	blockade	if	the	Spanish	agreed	to	discuss	possession	of	
the	Bidasoa.106	His	only	condition	was	that	the	people	of	Hendaye	enjoyed	the	river	





monarchy	 (where	 major	 decisions	 were	 taken),	 asked	 the	 Council	 of	 Castile	 (the	
highest	juridical	institution	of	the	Spanish	monarchy)	for	advice.	The	jurists'	answer	




exclusive	 jurisdiction	 in	 the	Bidasoa	and	badly	needed	a	convenient	 justification	 to	
present	his	decision	publicly.	It	was	not	about	being	right	anymore,	but	about	saving	






                                                
102	AHN,	Estado,	libro	630,	f.	119-120:	“Extraict	d’une	letter	de	M.	de	Boufflers	de	Bayonne	le	24e	
May	1685”	




104	“Razonamiento	 desynteressado”,	memorandum	 presented	 by	 the	 French	 ambassador,	 AHN,	













the	 symbolically	 important	 isle	 of	 Pheasants	 (the	 islet	 in	 which	 the	 royal	 ceremonies	 were	





up	 the	process	 by	 threatening	 “with	 accustomed	 force	 and	 exaggeration”	 (“con	 la	
fuerza	y	exageración	acostumbradas”)	to	throw	“four	or	five	thousand	bombs”	over	
Fonterabie	if	they	continued	to	refuse	Louis	XIV’s	demands.110	The	French	demanded	






Ratisbon. 112 	Border	 communities	 were	 practically	 absent	 of	 the	 negotiation	
process.113	In	 fact,	 Fonterabie	 refused	 any	 contact	 with	 Hendaye	 if	 not	 directly	
ordered	 by	 the	 King	 himself.114	In	 the	 end,	 Louis	 XIV	 obtained	 exactly	 what	 he	
wanted	–at	least	temporarily.	Hendaye	gained	access	to	the	river	in	equal	terms	with	
Fonterabie.	 In	spite	of	 it	all,	 it	 is	not	very	clear	what	advantage	Louis	XIV	obtained,	
apart	 from	 humiliating	 the	 Spanish	 monarchy.	 The	 new	 French	 fortification	
continued	 to	 be	 too	 modest	 to	 constitute	 a	 real	 military	 threat.	 The	 situation	 of	
Hendaye	itself	seemed	not	to	have	changed	significantly.	It	continued	to	be	what	it	
always	had	been:	a	small	fishing	village.	
As	 a	 matter	 of	 fact	 reprisals	 continued	 in	 other	 border	 contexts,	 like	 in	 the	
mountains	 of	 Navarre,	 not	 far	 away	 from	 Fonterabie. 115 	However	 during	 the	






the	 official	 diplomatic	 collection	 of	 Frédéric	 Léonard,	 Recueil	 des	 Traitez	 de	 Paix,	 de	 treve,	 de	
neutralité,	de	confederation,	d'alliance,	 et	de	commerce,	 faits	par	 les	 rois	de	France,	avec	 tous	 les	
princes,	et	potentats	de	l'Europe,	et	autres,	depuis	pres	de	trois	siecles,	 (Paris:	Léonard,	 imprimeur	
du	Roi	et	de	Monseigneur	le	Daufin,	1693),	IV,	s.f.:	Convention	faite	entre	le	Marquis	of	Feuquieres,	
et	 le	Marquis	of	Los	Balbazes.	Pour	 la	 liberté	de	 la	Pesche,	 et	de	 la	Navigation	dans	 la	Riviere	de	
Bidassoa,	 en	 faveur	 des	 Sujets	 de	 Sa	Majesté,	 et	 de	 ceux	 du	 Roi	 d'Espagne,	 avec	 toutes	 sortes	 de	
Vaisseaux,	sans	distinction	(dated	in	1683	instead	of	1685	–obviously	a	typo).	On	the	other	hand,	
the	Spanish	version	of	the	agreement	was	never	printed.	
112	A	 preliminary	 agreement	was	 achieved	 by	mid-October,	 AHN,	 Estado,	 libro	 630,	 f.	 543-550	
and	 558-560;	 however,	 the	 French	 introduced	many	 corrections,	 AGS,	 Estado,	 leg.	 K-1652,	 nº	
117,	119-122,	133,	and	135.	
113	AHN,	 Estado,	 libro	 628,	 f.	 130:	 Consulta	 of	 the	 Council	 of	 State,	 Madrid,	 12	May	 1680.	 The	
Count	of	Chinchón	disapproved	the	agreement	because	he	thougt	it	would	provoke	Fonterabie’s	
rebellion,	 AHN,	 Estado,	 libro	 630,	 f.	 317-327,	 Consulta	 of	 the	 Council	 of	 State,	 Madrid	 28	 July	
1685.	 However,	 Fonterabie	 accepted	 the	 agreement	 with	 few	 minor	 objections,	 AHN,	 Estado,	
libro	630,	f.	686-7,	Consulta	of	the	Council	of	State,	Madrid,	24	November	1685.	After	the	official	
approval	of	the	agreement	the	two	border	communities	were	ordered	to	discuss	on	the	ground	












following	 years	 there	 was	 no	 significant	 violence	 in	 the	 Bidasoa,	 even	 if	 tensions	
persisted.	 Some	 incidents	 in	 particular	 sparked	 strong	 protests	 by	 the	 French	
ambassador.116	Nonetheless,	 this	 time	 Louis	 XIV	 reacted	 with	moderation.	 At	 that	
moment	a	much	more	important	issue	demanded	his	attention.	The	already	delicate	
health	of	King	Charles	 II	of	Spain	was	worsening	and	everything	 suggested	 that	he	
would	 die	 without	 an	 heir.	 That	 made	 of	 Louis	 XIV	 a	 plausible	 candidate	 for	 the	





As	 we	 have	 already	 said,	 the	 period	 after	 1679	 is	 traditionally	 considered	 a	





Huguenots	 from	France	 in	1685,	 and	did	not	open	hostilities	until	 1689,	when	 the	
French	 had	 already	 occupied	 and	 ravaged	 the	 Palatinate.	 Nine	 years	 later,	 after	 a	
long	and	costly	war,	the	Peace	of	Ryswick	(1697)	re-established	the	status	quo	ante.	




Nonetheless,	 there	 were	 also	 other	 repercussions	 at	 a	 deeper	 level	 that	 went	
beyond	 the	 contingent	 world	 of	 diplomatic	 relations.	 After	 all,	 there	 was	 nothing	
particularly	 exceptional	 in	 the	 formation	 of	 alliances	 to	 counter	 the	 rise	 of	 a	
threatening	power.	It	could	be	said	that	this	was	actually	an	intrinsic	characteristic	of	
the	Early	Modern	European	“international”	system.	In	our	view	the	disturbing	effects	




                                                
116	There	were	 two	 serious	 incidents.	The	 first	 almost	put	 an	 abrupt	 end	 to	 the	negotiations:	 a	
rogue-shot	 fired	 from	 the	 Spanish	 side	 almost	 hit	 commander	 Boufflers	 while	 accompanying	
Vauban	 along	 Hendaye’s	 riverside,	 AHN,	 Estado,	 libro	 630,	 f.	 687v-689,	 see	 also:	 the	 Duke	 of	
Canzano	to	the	Duke	of	Canales,	San	Sebastián,	20	October	1685,	AHN,	Estado,	libro	630,	f.	708-















arguments	 in	 favour	 of	 declaring	 the	War	 of	Devolution	 against	 Spain	 in	 1668;	 he	
was	 again	 criticised	 for	 declaring	 war	 against	 the	 Dutch	 Republic	 without	 even	
providing	any	legal	pretext.119	However,	in	spite	of	it	all	nobody	could	deny	the	King	
of	France's	right	to	make	war	in	defence	of	what	he	thought	were	rightful	demands	–
even	 if	his	 justifications	were	 feeble.	War	was	a	 sovereign	prerogative	 reserved	 to	
rulers	who	did	not	 recognize	any	earthly	 superior	and	hence	could	not	 resort	 to	a	
higher	authority	to	decide	their	disputes.	Of	course,	it	was	expected	that	a	just	and	
Christian	 king	 would	 defend	 his	 rights	 by	 amicable	 means	 and	 well-founded	
arguments.	But	 if	diplomacy,	arbitration,	and	formal	protest	failed	he	had	the	right	
to	 resort	 to	 war	 –	 which	 in	 the	 early	modern	 period	 continued	 to	 be	 considered	
simply	as	“the	continuation	of	litigation	by	other	means”.120	If	war	was	conducted	in	
“due	 form”	 the	 victorious	 side	 was	 entitled	 to	 claim	 attribution	 of	 the	 object	 of	
contention	 (by	 law	of	 conquest	or	 ius	 victorium).	 Everybody	agreed	on	 that.	What	
was	 unprecedented	was	 Louis	 XIV's	 hybrid	 combination	 of	warlike	 hostility	 during	
peacetime,	 coercive	 diplomacy,	 legal	 arbitrariness,	 and	 a	 complete	 disdain	 for	
compromise,	reciprocity,	and	proportionality.	By	refusing	a	formal	declaration	of	war	
while	 carrying	out	 continuous	 acts	of	 aggression,	 Louis	 XIV	was	precluding	himself	
from	the	possibility	of	legitimating	his	annexations	by	ius	victorium.	Instead,	in	order	
to	 maintain	 the	 appearance	 of	 peace	 he	 was	 compelled	 to	 justify	 his	 continued	




The	most	 scandalous	 aspect	 of	 the	 politique	 des	 réunions	 was	 not	 the	 use	 of	
violence	 per	 se,	 but	 the	 abuse,	 fabrication	 and	 sophisticated	 manipulation	 of	
established	 legal	 principles,	 conventions,	 and	 customs	 to	 justify	 the	 arbitrary,	
unilateral	 advancement	 of	 Louis	 XIV’s	 claims	 by	 force	 during	 peacetime.	 In	 fact,	
French	 power	 politics	 was	 not	 only	 a	 threat	 for	 European	 peace,	 as	 is	 commonly	
acknowledged,	 but	 also	 for	 the	 very	 concept	 of	 ius	 gentium	 –that	 is,	 the	
international	 legal	 order	 as	 understood	 by	 Early	Modern	 statesmen.	 The	politique	
des	 réunions	 consciously	 ignored	 or	 debased	 basic	 principles	 established	 by	 both	
customary	 law	 and	 formal	 conventions	 that	 regulated	 relations	 among	 sovereign	
princes	in	both	war	and	peace.	
Louis	 XIV	 debased	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 negotiation,	 arbitration	 or	 litigation	 as	
ordinary	ways	to	settle	disputes	or	at	least	to	find	workable	agreements	peacefully.	
When	 required,	 he	 complied	 with	 the	 established	 custom	 of	 appointing	
commissioners	 to	 deal	 with	 foreign	 homologues	 concerning	 local	 controversies	 or	
                                                
118	Carl	 J.	 Ekberg,	 The	 Failure	 of	 Louis	 XIV’s	 Dutch	War,	 (Chapel	 Hill:	 The	 University	 of	 North	
Carolina	Press,	1979).	
119	Paul	 Sonnino,	 Louis	XIV	and	the	origins	of	the	Dutch	War	 (Cambridge:	 Cambridge	 University	
Press,	1988)	
120	Jeremy	Black,	European	Warfare,	1494-1660,	(London	and	New	York:	Routledge,	2002),	p.	22.	




the	 implementation	 of	 specific	 peace	 clauses	 on	 the	 ground.121 	However,	 he	
immediately	 emptied	 these	 conferences	 of	 any	 content,	 like	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	
French	commissioners	 in	 the	Bidasoa	and	 the	conference	of	Courtrai	 following	 the	
Peace	 of	 Nijmegen	 of	 1679.122	Louis	 XIV’s	 refusal	 of	 any	 amicable	 settlement	 was	
generally	the	result	of	a	skewed,	unilateral	interpretation	of	clauses	and	claims	that	
made	 compromise	 pointless.	 The	 French	 ministers	 substituted	 negotiation	 with	 a	
very	 disturbing	 mix	 of	 explicit	 threats,	 continuous	 ultimatums,	 and	 expedient	
methods	 with	 the	 only	 purpose	 of	 forcing	 immediate	 recognition	 of	 Louis	 XIV’s	
claims.	This	method	was	used	indistinctly	against	royal	officials	and	local	authorities.	





monarchs'	 absolute	 sovereign	 power.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 total	 superiority	 of	
sovereign	 power	 was	 also	 used	 to	 justify	 direct	 intervention	 in	 local	 affairs,	 thus	
debasing	 legal	border	orders	 largely	based	on	customary	arrangements.	Louis	XIV's	
violent	imposition	of	a	new	order	in	the	Bidasoa	undermined	underlying	principles	of	
trust,	 reciprocity	 and	 mutual	 recognition	 that	 prevailed	 between	 border	
communities.	That	became	particularly	evident	with	the	reluctance	of	Fonterabie	to	
participate	 in	 the	 agreements	 of	 bonne	 correspondance	 of	 1668	 and	 1674,	 its	
complete	 refusal	 in	 1684,	 and	 the	 many	 restrictions	 imposed	 by	 the	 Spanish	
monarchy	between	1690	and	1694.123	
Clearly,	 there	 was	 something	 troubling	 about	 Louis	 XIV’s	 policies	 that	 went	
beyond	 ordinary	 diplomatic	 and	 military	 concerns.	 His	 continuous,	 arbitrary,	 and	
disproportionate	 aggressions	 were	 an	 invitation	 to	 other	 powers	 to	 act	 the	 same	





unilateral,	 and	 frequently	 violent,	 action	 –as	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 criminalization	 of	
                                                





124	That	 is	 exactly	 what	 happened	 during	 the	 Nine	 Years	 War	 when	 the	 so-called	 “maritime	





as	an	enemy,	but	also	because	 it	 supposed	 the	 infringement	of	 formal	or	customary	navigation	
treaties,	the	arbitrary	invalidation	of	passports	and	licences,	and	even	serious	prejudices	to	own	
vassals.	 From	 the	 Basque	 point	 of	 view	 it	 was	 also	 a	 breach	 of	 natural	 law	 since	 the	 initial	






and	 the	 Sovereign	 Councils	 of	 Brisach	 and	 Besançon	 justifying	 the	 annexation	 of	
particular	territories	 in	Flanders	and	the	Rhineland.	French	ministers	made	a	 loose,	
arbitrary	use	of	local	customs,	feudal	law,	antiquarianism,	and	general	principles	of	
ius	 commune	 when	 convenient,	 but	 they	 were	 always	 ready	 to	 neglect	 them	 at	
will.125	Ultimately,	 it	was	 force	 that	made	prevail	 Louis	 XIV’s	 rights.	 In	 doing	 so	he	
debased	the	established	practice	of	formal	litigation	based	on	the	presentation	and	
validation	of	written	legal	instruments.	
At	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 French	 attitude	 lay	 an	 interpretation	 of	 the	 law	of	 nations	
that	 contradicted	 well-established	 conventions.	 In	 this	 sense	 the	 argumentation	
given	by	Croissy,	Louis	XIV’s	minister	of	foreign	affairs,	to	the	Spanish	ambassador	in	
a	series	of	conversations	held	in	the	autumn	of	1680	is	very	revealing.126	When	the	
Marquis	 of	 la	 Fuente	 asked	 him	 to	 stop	 coercive	 measures	 in	 order	 to	 permit	
commissioners	 to	 settle	 the	 Bidasoa	 dispute	 peacefully,	 “it	 being	 impossible	 that	
justice	 and	 violence	 concur	 at	 once”	 (“siendo	 imposible	 concordar	 a	 un	 mismo	
tiempo	la	justicia	y	la	violencia”),	he	simply	answered	that	he	would	do	so	as	soon	as	
the	 Spanish	met	 all	 his	 demands.	 Clearly,	 he	 was	 not	 interested	 in	 seeking	 a	 fair	
settlement	 or	 entering	 into	 negotiations,	 but	 in	 imposing	 a	 diktat.	 More	




of	 rights	 was	 based	 uniquely	 on	 the	 dynamic	 relation	 of	 forces	 between	 the	 two	
opposite	 sides	 over	 time.	 If	 until	 that	 moment	 Fonterabie	 enjoyed	 a	 privileged	
position	 it	 was	 precisely	 because	 for	 a	 long	 time	 its	 superiority	 could	 not	 be	
contested.	But	since	the	French	were	now	unquestionably	more	powerful,	they	were	
entitled	to	impose	new	terms	and	conditions	in	the	Bidasoa.	Interestingly	enough,	in	
saying	 this	 the	 minister	 subverted	 the	 meaning	 of	 the	 “cannon	 law”	 argument	
traditionally	 used	 to	 delegitimize	 the	 Spanish	 side.	 In	 his	 view,	 Fonterabie’s	 rights	
were	 illegitimate	 not	 because	 of	 his	 violent	 possession	 but	 because	 of	 his	 lack	 of	
strength	 to	maintain	his	 hegemonic	position.	 This	 answer	went	beyond	 the	 crude,	
cynical	 views	 ordinarily	 attributed	 to	 Croissy	 and	 Louvois.	With	 this	 statement,	 he	
was	 declaring	 null	 the	 established	 legal	 order	 between	 nations,	 the	 ius	 gentium	







                                                
125	Interestingly,	 Lespes	 de	 Hureaux	 recurred	 to	 the	 same	 kind	 of	 pseudo-legal,	 antiquarian	
argumentation	 used	 by	 the	 chambre	de	réunions	 of	 Metz	 to	 justify	 an	 eventual	 réunion	 of	 the	








the	 laws	 of	 war	 to	 peacetime.127	Once	 the	 town	 was	 captured,	 the	 enemy's	
allegations	 would	 be	 of	 no	 consequence	 because	 the	 object	 of	 contention	 would	
already	 be	 in	 the	 king’s	 hands	 (“vous	 plaiderez	 mains	 garnies”).	 Vauban	 used	 a	
sophisticated	 metaphor	 to	 justify	 his	 proposal.	 According	 to	 him,	 there	 were	 no	
more	equitable	judges	for	his	rightful	claims	than	the	cannons,	because	they	did	not	
lose	 time	 and	 could	 not	 be	 corrupted.	 If	 the	 king	wanted	 to	 obtain	 swift	 and	 fair	
justice	he	 should	nominate	 them	as	arbiters.	He	 should	not	 trust	 any	other	 judge.	




judicial	 ruling	 issued	by	Divine	Providence	–or,	 in	Machiavellian	 terms,	by	Fortune,	
an	 equally	 uncontrollable	 and	 hence	 “equitable”	 force.	 Vauban	 substituted	 the	
inscrutable	judgement	of	Heaven	with	the	largely	predictable	judgement	of	cannons.	
By	 denying	 the	 validity	 of	 an	 officially	 approved	 peace	 treaty,	 he	 extended	 the	
jurisdiction	 of	 cannons	 beyond	 the	 battlefield.	 Vauban’s	 ideas	 had	 very	 disturbing	
implications.	The	elevation	of	cannons	to	the	superior	moral	category	of	judges,	both	
in	peace	and	wartime,	implied	that	military	superiority	was	enough	to	legitimate	the	
use	of	 force	at	any	 time.	From	 this	point	of	 view,	and	 for	 the	 same	 reason,	peace	
talks	 and	 negotiations,	 in	which	 there	was	 no	 place	 for	 judge-cannons,	were	 seen	
more	as	hindrances	to	justice	than	as	legitimate	ways	to	settle	disputes.	
Vauban’s	positive	consideration	of	“cannons”	is	particularly	significant	because	it	
marked	a	deep	contrast	with	 the	 traditional	 view	of	artillery	as	an	 intrinsically	evil	
and	 dishonourable,	 even	 if	 useful	 and	 necessary	 instrument	 of	 war.	 Loathing	 the	
invention	of	artillery	was	a	common	theme	in	Renaissance	literature.128	However,	by	
the	 end	 of	 the	 seventeenth	 century	 this	 perception	 had	 changed	 dramatically.	
Thanks	 to	 the	 new	 prestige	 acquired	 by	 the	 natural	 sciences	 and	 the	 mechanical	
philosophy,	 cannons	 and	 other	 war	 machines	 began	 to	 be	 considered	 inventions	
worth	 of	 praise.129	This	 was	 due	 partly	 to	 the	 development	 of	 the	 study	 of	
ballistics.130	Artillery	began	to	be	seen	not	as	mere	practical	activity	but	as	a	science	
                                                
127	"Prenons	 Condé	 sans	 faire	 tant	 de	 cérémonies:	 quinze	 jours	 de	 temps	 en	 feront	 l'affaire,	 et	





128	See	 for	 example	 the	 entries	 “Arcabuz”	 and	 “Artilleria”	 in	 Sebastián	de	Covarrubias	Horozco,	
Tesoro	 de	 la	 lengua	 castellana	 o	 española,	 (Madrid:	 Luís	 Sánchez,	 1611),	 f.	 83r-84r	 and	 93v,	
respectively.	
129	Saint-Julien,	La	forge	de	vulcain,	p.	1-2.	See	also	the	entry	“Artillerie”	in	Denis	Diderot	and	Jean	
le	 Rond	 d’Alembert,	 Encyclopédie	 ou	 dictionnaire	 raisonné	 des	 sciences,	 des	 arts	 et	 des	métiers,	
(Bern	and	Lausanne:	 Sociétés	Typographiques,	1781),	p.	 561	and	563.	On	 the	 consideration	of	
machines	 in	 general	 see	 Gérard	 Simon,	 “Les	 machines	 au	 XVIIe	 siècle:	 usage,	 typologie,	
résonances	syboliques”,	Revue	des	Sciences	Humaines,	v.	LVIII,	nº	186-187	(1982),	9-31.	













Interestingly,	 French	 power	 politics	 addressed	 in	 practical	 terms	 some	 of	 the	
philosophical	 and	 moral	 concerns	 at	 the	 core	 of	 seventeenth-century	 intellectual	
debates.	 In	 particular,	 there	 were	 two	 major	 legal	 questions	 that	 sparked	 vivid	
debate	among	 contemporary	 thinkers.	On	 the	one	hand,	 the	unclear	 status	of	 the	
customary	 ius	 gentium	 in	 relation	 with	 the	 ius	 naturale,	 and	 on	 the	 other,	 the	
ambiguous	 relation	 between	 the	 concepts	 of	 law,	 justice,	 and	 force.	 It	 is	
commonplace	in	current	historiography	to	approach	these	topics	through	the	study	
of	 a	 short	 list	 of	 canonical	 texts.	 In	 many	 respects,	 our	 knowledge	 of	 the	 Early	
Modern	law	of	nations	continues	to	be	articulated	around	a	genealogical	narrative	of	
intertextual	 references	 with	 little	 connection	 with	 the	 actual	 political,	 legal,	 and	
cultural	practices	of	the	time.132	That	explains	the	enduring	divide	between,	on	the	
one	 hand,	 practitioners	 of	 Political	 and	 Military	 History,	 and	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	
historians	of	Early	Modern	Political	and	Legal	Thought.	I	am	not	going	to	discuss	here	
the	many	 complexities	 of	 this	 issue.	What	 I	 would	 like	 to	 stress	 instead	 it	 is	 that	
authors	 like	 Grotius,	 Hobbes,	 Pufendorf,	 or	 Leibniz	 were	 trying	 to	 respond	 to	 the	
deep	crisis	of	authority	in	which	the	traditional	concept	of	ius	gentium	had	fallen.133	








The	 author	 who	 betters	 explained	 the	 serious	 consequences	 of	 Louis	 XIV’s	
doctrine	 of	 power	 politics	 was	 one	 of	 his	 most	 fervent	 critics:	 G.	W.	 Leibniz.134	A	
                                                




133	Jan	Schröder,	 “The	Concept	of	 (Natural)	Law	 in	 the	Doctrine	of	Law	and	Natural	Law	of	 the	
Early	 Modern	 Era”,	 in	 Lorraine	 Daston	 and	 Michael	 Stolleis	 (eds.),	 Natural	 Law	 and	 Laws	 of	
Nature	in	Early	Modern	Europe.	Jurisprudence,	Theology,	Moral	and	Natural	Philosophy,	(Farnham:	
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134 Patrick	Riley,	Leibniz’	Universal	Jurisprudence:	Justice	and	the	Charity	of	the	Wise,	 (Cambridge	




philosopher	by	 vocation,	 and	a	 jurist	by	education,	he	was	also	deeply	 involved	 in	
the	 political	 affairs	 of	 the	 time	 at	 the	 service	 of	 different	 potentates	 of	 the	 Holy	
Roman	Empire,	including	the	Emperor	himself.	Leibniz	was	also	fully	acquainted	with	
French	 affairs.	His	major	 philosophical	 treatises	 are	well	 known	but	 he	 also	wrote	
other	kind	of	works,	like	libels	and	memoranda	with	specific	political	purposes.	As	in	
the	 case	 of	 other	 contemporary	 thinkers,	 his	 varied	 intellectual	 interests	 and	 his	
experience	 of	 worldly	 affairs	 went	 hand	 in	 hand.135	Leibniz	 exposed	 the	 serious	
juridical	 implications	 of	 the	politique	 des	 réunions	 in	 a	 famous	 libel	 entitled	Mars	
Christianissimus	Autore	Germano	Gallo-Graeco,	Ou	Apologie	des	Armes	du	Roy	Tres-











right	 to	 enforce	 whatever	 came	 to	 his	 mind	 as	 far	 as	 it	 served	 to	 enlarge	 his	




“cannon	 law”	 doctrine	 sketched	 by	 Croissy	 and	 Vauban)	 contradicted	 established	
principles	 of	 ius	 commune.	 That	 explains	why	 it	 was	 so	 difficult	 for	 the	 French	 to	
justify	 Louis	 XIV’s	 policies	 with	 ordinary	 legal	 arguments.	 For	 this	 reason,	 the	
smartest	among	them	preferred	to	limit	themselves	to	talk	as	“politiques”	instead	of	
entering	 into	 any	 legal	 dispute.	 In	 any	 case,	 litigation	 was	 pointless	 because	 the	
greatness	of	the	King	of	France	prevailed	over	every	law	and	vow.	That	was	of	course	








Germans”	 –that	 is,	 the	 princes	 of	 the	 Holy	 Roman	 Empire	 that	 in	 spite	 of	 all	
continued	to	be	allied	with	France.	Eventually,	even	those	would	change	their	minds.	









Samuel	 von	 Pufendorf.	 Like	 Leibniz,	 Pufendorf	 was	 deeply	 involved	 in	 politics.	 He	
served	as	counsellor,	 jurist,	and	official	historiographer	of	the	King	of	Sweden	until	
1688,	 when	 he	 accepted	 an	 invitation	 of	 the	 Elector	 of	 Brandenburg	 to	 move	 to	
Berlin.	 Initially,	 both	 Pufendorf’s	 masters	 were	 supporters	 of	 France	 and	 fierce	
opponents	 of	 the	 Habsburgs.	 In	 his	 Introduction	 to	 the	 History	 of	 the	 Principal	
Kingdoms	 and	 States	 of	 Europe,	 Pufendorf	 still	 considered	 Louis	 XIV	 in	 a	 positive	
manner	as	the	most	powerful	king	and	actually	the	arbiter	of	Europe.137	His	opinion	
was	 in	 line	 with	 the	 traditional	 protestant	 view	 of	 France	 as	 a	 necessary	
counterbalance	 power	 against	 the	 Catholic	 hegemony	 of	 the	 Habsburg	 dynasty.	
However,	his	dissertation	stopped	at	the	Peace	of	Nijmegen,	that	is,	before	the	full	
implementation	of	the	politique	des	réunions.		By	the	end	of	1680,	Pufendorf’s	views	
have	 changed.	 He	 wrote	 for	 the	 king	 of	 Sweden	 De	 occasionibus	 foederum	 inter	
Sueciam	et	Galliam	et	quam	parum	illa	ex	parte	Galliae	observata	sint	to	justify	the	
rupture	 of	 his	 traditional	 alliance	 with	 France.	 Some	 years	 later	 Pufendorf	
denounced	 the	 revocation	 of	 the	 Edict	 of	 Nantes	 in	 his	 De	 habitu	 religionis	
christianae	ad	vitam	civilem,	in	which	he	invited	Prince-Elector	Friedrich-Wilhelm	of	
Brandenburg	 to	 severe	 his	 opportunistic	 alliance	 with	 France	 in	 order	 to	 lead	 a	
Protestant	coalition	against	the	unholy	tyranny	of	Louis	XIV.138	It	is	fair	to	say	that	all	
these	 writings	 were	 part	 of	 propaganda	 campaigns	 orchestrated	 by	 Louis	 XIV’s	
enemies.139	And	yet,	 they	were	more	than	 libels.	Both	Leibniz	and	Pufendorf	had	a	




In	many	 respects	 the	politique	 des	 réunions	 was	 the	 confirmation	 of	 the	 deep	
crisis	of	authority	 in	which	the	customary	 ius	gentium	had	fallen	by	the	end	of	the	
seventeenth	 century.	 At	 the	 core	 of	 this	 issue	was	 the	 problem	 of	 legal	 certainty	
(certitudo).141	That	was	particularly	 truth	 in	 the	case	of	 customary	 legal	orders	 like	
the	law	of	nations,	in	which	there	were	no	clear	obligation	to	adhere	to	established	
rules.	This	lack	of	confidence	on	the	traditional	juridical	culture	was	shared	not	only	
by	 Louis	 XIV’s	 ministers	 but	 also	 by	 an	 increasingly	 number	 of	 jurists.	 Leibniz,	
Pufendorf,	 and	other	 contemporary	 authors,	 hoped	 to	 overcome	 legal	 uncertainty	
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by	 applying	 to	 natural	 law	 a	 “scientific”	 method	 comparable	 to	 the	 one	 used	 in	
natural	 sciences	 in	order	 to	establish	 clear,	 universal	 legal	principles	 (the	 so-called	
more	 geometrico).142	In	 particular,	 Louis	 XIV’s	 power	 politics	 prompted	 Leibniz	 to	
propose	a	universal	jurisprudence	based	on	the	idea	of	“justice	as	the	charity	of	the	
wise”	 that	he	significantly	stated	 for	 the	 first	 time	 in	 the	 introduction	to	his	Codex	
juris	 gentium	diplomaticus	 (Hannover:	 Samuelis	 Ammonii,	 1693)	 –a	 compilation	 of	
documents	reunited	in	response	to	French	réunions	and	territorial	claims	in	the	Holy	
Roman	 Empire.	 But	 even	 him	 acknowledged	 that	 the	 law	 of	 nations	 was	 nothing	
more	than	a	collection	of	formalities	deprived	of	intrinsic	moral	sense	that	changed	
throughout	history,	as	 it	could	be	easily	 learnt	 from	reading	ancient	peace	treaties	
and	 other	 official	 documents.143	In	 a	 world	 of	 continuous	 competition	 among	
sovereigns	in	which	the	law	of	nations	tended	to	be	equated	with	natural	law,	fear	of	
God	 did	 not	 work	 as	 a	 deterrent	 anymore	 –thus	 vows	 and	 promises	 lost	 their	
traditional	 value.	 In	 such	 a	 world	 the	 responsibility	 of	 keeping	 an	 ambitious	 and	
powerful	 ruler	 as	 Louis	 XIV	 at	 bay	 lay	 on	 a	 society	 of	 sovereign	 peers	 (and	 in	
Pufendorf’s	 opinion,	 particularly	 protestants)144	willing	 to	 punish	 any	 breaching	 of	
the	 established	 order.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 challenge	 of	 the	 politique	 des	 réunions	
pushed	 for	 a	 refashioning	of	 the	old	doctrine	of	 the	balance	of	power	 as	 the	only	
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